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Abstract 
Human and organizational factors, from the organizational level to the procedural and 
technical levels, can impact personnel. The human and organizational factors associated 
with personnel responses should be identified and managed in the emergency escape plan. 
This study presents a framework for human and organizational factors risk management 
in the escape and evacuation of offshore installations. The design and development of the 
framework are divided into four categories: a) identifying the presence of human and 
organizational factors in the safety barriers of escape and evacuation systems, b) 
estimating the probability of how human and organizational factors can affect personnel 
responses, c) combining the probabilities of personnel failing to respond with the 
consequential effects to assess risks, and d) applying a safety hierarchy to risk 
management of human and organizational factors in the escape and evacuation system. 
The first case study considered in this thesis examines the Macondo blowout, finding that 
insufficient emergency exercises, poor communication, impairment of personnel’s 
physical abilities due to unsafe conditions, and poor emergency preparedness planning 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of emergency escape and evacuation. In the second 
study, a Bayesian analysis is used to connect the human and organizational factors that 
affect every safety barrier. Using illustrative data, the study identifies the scheduled 
maintenance of alarm systems as a critical human and organizational factor for notifying 
personnel of emergencies on offshore installations. In the third study, personnel response 
to emergency alarms is shown to be affected by cold temperature, strong winds, and 
darkness during emergency scenarios, thereby impacting risk. The fourth study is used to 
complete the risk management framework of human and organizational factors. In the 
fourth study, a safety hierarchy consisting of inherent safety, engineering safety, and 
procedural safety is used in the risk management framework. Examples of engineering 
ii 
 
safety presented in the study are the use of lighting and dynamic exit signs in assisting 
personnel to escape from hazardous areas. In terms of procedural safety, personnel who 
received frequent practice of escape activities performed better than personnel without 
such practice. To conclude this study, the framework is identified as a practical tool for 
minimizing and managing human and organizational factors and risks present in the 
escape and evacuation of offshore installations. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Offshore installations operating in remote areas or harsh environmental conditions 
demand a high priority be placed on safety. Escape and evacuation is one of the features 
of a safety management program for offshore installations. The main purpose of escape 
and evacuation is to protect personnel from potential severe injuries and loss that can be 
caused by major internal and external events. 
Examples of emergency situations are well blowout, the loss of containment in 
risers, pipelines, or process facilities, fires and explosions, the collapse of an installation’s 
structure, collisions involving vessels or helicopters, and severe weather conditions 
(Wallace, 1992). Each emergency scenario may require different types of approaches and 
strategies regarding escape and evacuation. In such challenging scenarios, escape and 
evacuation operations depend on appropriate personnel responses and performance. 
Not all escape and evacuation practices and preparations can be implemented and 
operated as accurately as planned in the emergency response plan. Uncontrolled 
emergency scenarios introduce chains of events that can affect personnel and their 
performance. The presence of evolving hazards, such as intense heat and black smoke, 
can also influence a personnel’s ability in making decisions and taking action (USCG, 
2011). Human and organizational factors may exist unnoticed in the safety barriers of 
escape and evacuation and emerge as contributing factors, leading to the failure of escape 
and evacuation operations (i.e. latent and active failures). Safety barriers of escape and 
evacuation can include basic survival training, emergency drills and exercises, alarm 
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systems, emergency equipment, personal survival equipment, systematic procedures, 
command and control, and compliance with regulations and safety laws (CAPP, 2010; 
HSE, 1997; IADC, 2014; OGP, 2010; Maan, 2007). 
1.2 Problem Identified 
Personnel who have to interact with the presence of hazards and human and 
organizational factors in emergency scenarios will not always be able to perform escape 
and evacuation effectively (Paté-Cornell, 1993; Robertson and Wright, 1997; USCG, 
2011). Examples of human and organizational factors related to such situations are a lack 
of knowledge and skills due to inadequate training and emergency drills provided by the 
operators of offshore installations. A main concern in the escape and evacuation system 
and its operations are human and organizational factors, which may go unnoticed in 
barriers involving equipment, regulations and procedures, organizational factors, and 
training.     
1.3 Objective of Study 
This research aims to develop a framework for human and organizational risk factors 
assessment and management for the escape and evacuation system of offshore 
installations. The framework should be able to improve or manage personnel responses 
and performances that are affected by human and organizational factors in escape and 
evacuation.   
1.4 Scope of Work 
The framework of human and organizational factors risk management is developed 
according to the following steps: 
i) Identifying evolving hazards and human and organizational factors that can lead to 
unsafe escape and evacuation operations.   
3 
 
ii) Estimating the probability of personnel and organizational factors that can cause 
unsafe escape and evacuation operations.  
iii) Assessing the risks associated with performance in escape and evacuation involving 
harsh environmental conditions.  
iv) Developing risk management strategies to reduce and manage risks associated with 
performance.  
The lists of steps are summarized in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1.1: Steps for developing a framework of human and organizational factors. 
1.5 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
i) Chapter 2 discusses the novelty and contribution of the research work.  
ii) Chapter 3 describes studies related to human and organizational factors and risk 
assessment.  
iii) Chapter 4 explains the development of a framework for human and organizational 
factors.  
iv) Chapter 5 presents a research paper titled ‘Human and Organizational Factors 
Assessment of the Evacuation Operation of BP Deepwater Horizon Accident’.  
Step 1: Identifying human and organizational factors  
in escape and evacuation system
Step 2: Estimating probability of human and 
organizational factors and personnel response
Step 3: Assessing risks associated with personnel 
response
Step 4: Developing risk management strategies
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v) Chapter 6 presents a research paper titled ‘Prioritizing Safety Critical Human and 
Organizational Factors of EER Systems of Offshore Installations in a Harsh 
Environment’.  
vi) Chapter 7 presents a research paper titled ‘Dynamic Risk Assessment of Escape and 
Evacuation in a Harsh Environment’.  
vii) Chapter 8 presents a research paper titled ‘The Use of a Virtual Environment in 
Managing Risks Associated with Human Responses in Emergency Situations on 
Offshore Installations’.  
viii) Chapter 9 concludes the research work and discusses research limitations and future 
work.  
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Chapter 2 
Contributions and Novelty  
2.1 Contributions 
This research is directed to people in the field of engineering, safety, risk analysis, and 
human factors. The contributions of this research include the introduction and 
development of:  
i) A framework to identify human and organizational risk factors in the escape and 
evacuation system. 
ii) A model to quantify human and organizational factors that contribute to unsafe 
escape and evacuation operations.  
iii) A strategy to minimize risks of human and organizational factors associated with 
personnel performance. 
The contributions are further discussed in Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3. 
2.1.1 Development of a Framework for Identifying Human and Organizational 
Factors 
A framework is designed to identify and address the presence of human and 
organizational factors in safety barriers for the escape and evacuation system. The human 
and organizational factors involved in every safety barrier can lead to the poor 
performance of personnel in accomplishing escape and evacuation activities. The 
uniqueness of the framework is explained in Section 2.2.1. The application of the 
framework is also discussed in the first research paper (Chapter 5) entitled ‘Human and 
Organizational Factors Assessment of the Evacuation Operation of BP Deepwater 
Horizon Accident’.    
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2.1.2 Development of a Model for Quantifying Human and Organizational Factors 
A model is created to quantify the human and organizational factors that can affect 
personnel responses and their performance in escape and evacuation activities. The model 
first estimates the probability of the failure of personnel responses. The probability data 
of human and organizational factors is obtained from the translation of guidewords as 
described in Section 2.2.2, which makes the model unique. The model is then extended to 
assess risks associated with personnel by including the consequential effects of failing to 
respond safely in the escape and evacuation. A second research paper entitled 
‘Prioritizing Safety Critical Human and Organizational Factors of EER Systems’ in 
Chapter 6 and a third research paper entitled ‘Dynamic Risk Assessment of Escape and 
Evacuation in a Harsh Environment’ in Chapter 7 discuss the application of the model in 
the escape and evacuation operations.   
2.1.3 Development of a Strategy for Minimizing Risks 
A strategy is used to reduce or manage risks associated with personnel responses. The 
strategy is arranged systematically according to the hierarchy, from inherent safety to 
engineering safety and finally to procedural safety. The strategy used in this research is 
novel because of the last part of the framework of risk management that includes the 
presence of human and organizational factors as described in Section 2.2.1. Chapter 7 
presents the application of the strategy in the fourth research entitled ‘The Use of a 
Virtual Environment in Managing Risks Associated with Human Responses in 
Emergency Situations on Offshore Installations’.     
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2.2 Novelty  
2.2.1 The Integration of Human and Organizational Factors in the Framework of 
Risk Management  
This research presents human and organizational factors integrated qualitatively and 
quantitatively in the framework of risk analysis and risk management of the operation of 
escape and evacuation on offshore installations. This research emphasizes the presence of 
human and organizational factors a) in the organizational level, b) during the interaction 
between personnel and emergency equipment, and c) in the event when personnel are 
performing the escape and evacuation in poor weather conditions. The integration of 
human and organizational factors in the framework is shown in Chapters 4 to 8.     
2.2.2 The Use of Guidewords in Standard Practices as Probability Data 
This research work uses probability data that are translated from guidewords available in 
offshore oil and gas industry standard practices and guidelines. The use of the guidewords 
as data may reflect the effectiveness of standard practices and guidelines provided by 
regulators. This is illustrated in this research study. Further explanation of translating 
guidewords to probability data is available in Chapters 6 and 7.    
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Overview  
This research work studies four areas in the process of developing a framework for 
human and organizational risk management. The four areas are as follows:   
i) human and organizational factors,  
ii) the use of Bayesian analysis for the study of human and organizational factors,  
iii) risk assessment, and 
iv) risk management.  
These areas are further reviewed and discussed in Sections 3.2 to 3.5.   
3.2 Human and Organizational Factors  
Human factors are widely discussed based on the Swiss cheese model introduced by 
Reason (2000). In defining human factors, HSE (2009) emphasized three aspects: the 
individual, the job assigned to the individual, and the organization in which the individual 
is employed. The interaction between the individual, the job, and the organization should 
be enhanced using a life-cycle. The life-cycle has a link connecting the organization to 
the job, followed by a second link between the job and the individual, and continued with 
another link between the individual to the organization. The link between the individual 
and the organization may illustrate the impact of organizational factors on an individual.   
The definition of human factors can broaden to include an organizational factor. 
The success of an organization depends on individuals’ performances without the 
presence of human factors (AIChE, 2007).  The decisions made by organizations can 
10 
 
influence the performance of the individuals working for them. The organization’s goals 
can shape or mould the culture and environment in which an individual works.   
Based on studies defining human and organizational factors, this research work 
defines human and organizational factors in the context of the emergency escape 
described in Chapter 5.   
3.3 Bayesian Analysis for Human and Organizational Factors 
Human and organizational factors can be studied using a Bayesian analysis. The benefit 
of Bayesian analysis is the flexibility to integrate human and organizational factors with 
technical factors, procedures, individuals’ abilities, and management systems. The 
Bayesian analysis introduces a cause-and-effect relationship, which is applicable in 
investigating human and organizational factors.  
Cai et al. (2013) presented a study of human factors during repair actions on 
offshore environments using Bayesian analysis. The study divides human factors into 
three categories: individual, organizational, and group factors. From the study, the human 
factor is identified as a contributing factor and directly proportional to the potential 
failure of components, which can only be reduced by doing regular maintenance.  
Léger et al. (2009) developed a methodology considering technical, human and 
organizational aspects to anticipate critical situations in high risk industries such as in 
nuclear power plants and chemical processing plants. The technical, human and 
organizational aspects are integrated using Bayesian analysis in estimating the failure 
probability and its outcomes associated with individual actions. The study shows that 
Bayesian analysis is a practical tool to address the failure of individual actions involving 
organizational factors and technical systems.    
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According to the application of Bayesian analysis for human and organizational 
factors, this research work discusses Bayesian analysis in quantifying human and 
organizational factors in Chapters 6 and 7.   
3.4 Risk Assessment  
The risk assessment of human and organizational factors can be described through both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses. Paté-Cornell and Murphy (1996) introduced the 
system-action-management (SAM) approach, which has the ability to connect 
probabilities of system failures to human and management factors. The authors observed 
the importance of understanding the relationship between human and management 
factors, which are often overlooked by human factor specialists and engineers. The reason 
for designing the approach is to improve probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) that primarily 
deals with technical rather than organizational safety improvements in managing and 
reducing risks. The SAM approach integrates the PRA of the physical system, decisions 
and actions that affect the probabilities of basic events, and management factors that 
influence decisions and actions.  
Risk assessment of human and organizational factors can be assessed using a 
dynamic approach. Dynamic risk assessment should consider time dependencies using 
prior and posterior probabilities. Instead of depending on periods of time, Cacciabue 
(2000) presented a dynamic interaction between individual and machine that is able to 
include human factors into the risk analysis of a complex system. The approach has five 
basic elements: retrospective-prospective study, task analysis, data and parameters 
identification, human-machine interaction modelling, and dynamic reliability modelling, 
for assessing the risk of hazardous material and energy releases due to an accident. The 
risk assessment considering a dynamic interaction between individual and machine is 
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different from one person to another person, which can result in a variation of levels for 
risks.      
The application of human and organizational factors risk assessment has varied in 
different industries. Skogdalen and Vinnem (2011) proposed the integration of human and 
organizational factors into quantitative risk analysis (QRA) that can be differentiated to 
four levels. The QRA in Level 1 is related to technical analysis without considering 
human and organizational factors. For the QRAs in Level 2, there is an explanation of 
human, operational, and organizational factors related to technical analysis and their 
influence on the system. The QRAs in Level 3 evaluate studies on the human and 
organizational factors using human error probability (HEP), human reliability assessment 
(HRA), the human error probability index (HEPI), and techniques for human error rate 
prediction (THERP). After that, the QRA models are adjusted according to the results 
from the human and organizational factors studies. Finally, the QRAs in Level 4 present 
human and organizational factors as important as the technical analysis. From the study, 
none of the QRAs of offshore installations from five operating companies achieved Level 
4. This is one of the reasons the authors stated that the consideration of human and 
organizational factors in QRA studies is relatively superficial. The paper discusses the 
challenges of organizational assessment, such as the difficulty to relate all organizational 
factors with each other and how the organizational assessment depends on observations 
and interviews, which causes difficulties in detecting deteriorating performance. 
The application of risk assessment to human and organizational factors can be 
observed in a research study on muster activities on offshore platforms (Deacon et al., 
2010). The researchers focused on the possible consequences of failing to complete the 
muster steps in the event of man overboard, gas release, or fire and explosion. Four 
categories of consequence severity were introduced: a) effect on individual health, b) 
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effect on the ability to complete the muster, c) effect on the severity of the muster initiator 
and d) effect on other personnel on board. The study emphasizes that reducing the 
categories with the highest severity may be beneficial, but would not reduce the overall 
consequence severity. Consequences reduction is a practical approach prior to allocating 
resources to mitigation barrier improvement in the muster steps.     
Human and organizational factors risk assessment was recently applied in a virtual 
environment. Monferini et al. (2013) presented a compound methodology that is able to 
integrate virtual reality and human and organizational factors concepts by addressing end-
users’ practical safety issues such as control room operators’ training, proper alarm 
system design, and team coping with emergencies. The methodology consists of a task 
modeller, fuzzy probability estimator, and artificial logic Bayesian algorithm. The fuzzy 
probability estimator is developed to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs). The 
artificial logic Bayesian algorithm tool discloses all possible sequences of events leading 
to an accident and thus reflects the level of knowledge about the system under analysis. 
The study identified nine common performance conditions: adequacy of organization, 
working conditions, adequacy of man-machine interaction, procedures and plans, number 
of simultaneous goals, available time, the time of the day, training and experience, and 
crew collaboration. Risks and performance influenced by human and organizational 
factors can be understood and assessed in a virtual environment prior to changes in the 
safety management system.         
 Risk assessment for human and organizational factors using Bayesian analysis is 
further discussed in Chapter 7.    
3.5 Risk Management 
Risk management is defined as a coordinated activity of a system or an organization 
focusing on risks to an individual and environment (ISO, 2009). The activity begins with 
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identifying hazards, understanding and assessing risks, and making decisions to prevent, 
control and mitigate risks (Amyotte and McCutcheon, 2006). In oil and gas industry 
practices, safety measures are recommended to reduce the probability of hazards and 
minimize the impacts they have on individuals and the environment (Aven and Vinnem, 
2007).   
Risk management can be used to reduce uncertainty in making decisions. Bjerga 
and Aven (2015) introduce adaptive risk management in dealing with large uncertainties 
prior to decision making. In situations when people have two different alternatives, they 
must consider the consequences and uncertainty before taking appropriate action.     
Körte (2003) presents a method known as contingent risk and decision analysis to 
support decision making in complex situations with limited time. A lack of ability to 
assess risks and the uncertainty of outcomes are the challenges when making correct 
decisions. The method has nine steps: identification of hazards, consequences definition, 
decision alternatives, decision influence model, identification of contingent variables, 
contingent model definition, contingent risk analysis, definition of decision criteria, and 
decision familiarization and training. All the nine steps are associated with organizational 
factors, which can contribute to either success or failure of an individual in making 
decisions during critical situations.  
Based on the definition of risk management and its purpose, the research work 
introduces procedures to reduce or manage risks associated with performance as 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 4 
Development of Framework 
4.1 Overview  
The framework of human and organizational factors risk management for escape and 
evacuation is developed according to four categories: 
i) Identifying human and organizational factors in the escape and evacuation system 
ii) Estimating the probability of failure of personnel responses 
iii) Assessing risks of failing to perform during escape and evacuation operations 
iv) Minimizing risks associated with human personnel responses in escape and 
evacuation 
All these categories are dependent on each other in terms of the development and 
extension of the framework. The details of each category are described in Sections 4.2 to 
4.5.    
4.2 Identifying Human and Organizational Factors 
The first step in developing the framework is to identify human and organizational factors 
and hazards that may exist in the safety barriers of the escape and evacuations system. 
The main purpose of the first step is to address human and organizational factors in every 
safety barrier prior to emergency situations leading to escape and evacuation.  
Escape and evacuation depend on a type of initiating event, such as hydrocarbon 
releases, fires and explosions, man overboard, and collisions involving vessels or 
helicopters. Initiating event is a term for emergency situations and a main point to begin 
the process of identifying human and organizational factors as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
The emergency situation initiates the use of safety barriers in the escape and evacuation 
18 
 
system. The limitations of safety barriers, in particular emergency response plans, 
personal survival equipment, facilities and equipment for emergencies, alarm systems, 
procedures, chain of command, and communication, is the presence of human and 
organizational factors.  
A layer of protection is used to identify the human and organizational factors in 
every safety barrier. All safety barriers are categorized as organizational, procedural, 
technical, or personnel. Human and organizational factors present in every safety barrier 
may impact personnel responses in escape and evacuation.  
The sequence of procedures in the framework is shown in Figure 4.1. The 
framework and its approach are discussed in Chapter 5 of the first research paper entitled 
‘Human and Organizational Factors Assessment of the Evacuation Operation of BP 
Deepwater Horizon Accident’. 
 
  
Figure 4.1: The sequence of the procedure to identify human and organizational factors. 
4.3 Estimating the Probability of Failure  
The second step requires the framework to be extended to describe a model to estimate 
the probability of personnel responses considering human and organizational factors. The 
objective of the second step is to determine the failure of personnel performances that 
have impacts on escape and evacuation operations. Bayesian analysis is used for the 
calculation of the probability of personnel responses. To obtain the probability, the 
Initiating events require escape 
and evacuation
Human and organizational factors 
identification
Personnel response
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Bayesian analysis includes human and organizational factors in every safety barrier 
provided for escape and evacuation systems. The details of the second part of the 
framework and its application are discussed in Chapter 6 of the second research paper 
entitled ‘Prioritizing Safety Critical Human and Organizational Factors of EER Systems 
of Offshore Installations in a Harsh Environment’. Figure 4.2 shows the sequence of 
procedures to find the probability of human responses considering human and 
organizational factors.    
  
Figure 4.2: The sequence of the procedure to estimate probability of personnel responses. 
4.4 Assessing Risks of Failing to Respond 
The third step of the framework development involves assessing risks associated with 
personnel responses. The third step is an extension of the second part of the framework as 
shown in Figure 4.3. The purpose of the third step is to analyse the probability and the 
impacts of the failure of performing escape and evacuation activities considering the 
presence of human and organizational factors. Risks can be measured and assessed by 
quantifying the probability of the failure and its consequences. The risk assessment is 
designed to be a dynamic risk assessment that is applicable to changing safety barriers or 
environmental conditions over time. Dynamic risk assessment means that risks associated 
with personnel responses can be updated based on new information and the probability of 
environmental conditions and types of safety barriers at different times. Chapter 7 
Probability Bayesian
Initiating events require escape 
and evacuation
Human and organizational factors 
identification
Personnel response
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contains the third research paper entitled ‘Dynamic Risk Assessment of Escape and 
Evacuation in a Harsh Environment’ and has more information regarding risk assessment 
and its use, including harsh environmental conditions in the risk assessment.   
 
  
Figure 4.3: The sequence of the procedure for assessing risks associated with personnel responses. 
4.5 Minimizing Risks Associated With Personnel Responses 
Figure 4.4 presents the fourth step of the framework, which also completes the framework 
development. The fourth step includes a risk management of personnel responses 
considering human and organizational factors. After assessing the risks of human 
responses, risk acceptance is used to determine whether it is acceptable, or not, according 
to the safety rules or organization. If the risk is low and acceptable to the organization and 
safety rules, escape and evacuation operations are presumed to be safe for the personnel. 
In case the risk is unacceptable, the risk must be controlled considering the existing and 
newly designed safety barriers. The uniqueness of the risk management in this part of the 
work is the use of a safety hierarchy in designing and implementing safety barriers based 
on weaknesses in human responses. Chapter 8 has information on the risk management 
Probability Consequences
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and its application to emergency escape as presented in the fourth research paper entitled 
‘The Use of a Virtual Environment in Managing Risks Associated with Human 
Responses in Emergency Situations on Offshore Installations’.   
 
 
Figure 4.4: The complete sequence of procedures for assessing and managing risks associated 
with personnel responses. 
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Abstract 
The offshore oil and gas industry is applying more advanced technologies to explore and 
produce petroleum in challenging environmental regions. To meet the demands of these 
conditions, operators need to take suitable precautions relating to emergency response and 
evacuation procedures in terms of technology, management, operations, and personnel 
competence. The successful evacuation operations are dependent upon a comprehensive 
preparedness should an incident occur. However, many reports of offshore accidents 
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reveal that human factors contribute to the failure of evacuation. This paper addresses and 
discusses the contribution of human factors to the evacuation operations of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon accident using a proposed tool. A framework of the tool consists of 
the evacuation protective layers and the evacuation preparedness plan. Human factors are 
discussed and analysed at different stages; that is, the organization, personnel’s 
competence, the evacuation procedures, and the emergency equipment. As a result, the 
insufficient emergency drills and exercises, poor communications, impairment of 
personnel physical ability due to unsafe conditions, and poor emergency preparedness 
plan were identified as human factors contributing to the unsuccessful evacuation 
operations of the Macondo well blowout.  
5.1 Introduction 
Escape, evacuation, and rescue (EER) from offshore installations is a last line of defense 
in preventing loss of life and serious injury from unsafe and hazardous conditions, such as 
well blowouts, uncontrolled fire, an impending or actual ship collision, extreme weather, 
loss of containment of a riser or subsea pipeline, and loss of containment in the process 
facilities (IADC, 2010; Wallace, 1992). Unsuccessful EER operations can have tragic 
outcomes with a high number of fatalities, such as the Piper Alpha platform disaster, the 
Alexander L. Kielland accommodation platform collapse, and the Ocean Ranger tragedy 
(Cullen, 1990; Skogdalen, Khorsandi & Vinnem, 2012; USCG, 1983).  
Human factors play a role in the unsuccessful or unsafe evacuation of offshore 
structures. Failures such as the late activation of a general alarm, personnel’s ability to act 
being compromised by the hazards, incompetent management of lifeboats and life rafts, 
lack of command and control, as well as communication problems have been addressed in 
many evacuation operations of offshore accidents. Many qualitative and quantitative 
studies on EER in offshore installations have been done by human factors researchers 
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(Basra & Kirwan, 1998; Gould & Au, 1995; Musharraf et al., 2013; Woodcock & Au, 
2013; Yun & Marsden, 2010). Studies involving human errors in EER often result in 
recommendations such as improving EER training (Deacon, Amyotte, & Khan, 2010; 
DiMattia, Khan, & Amyotte, 2005; Kennedy, 1993; Skogdalen, Khorsandi, & Vinnem, 
2012). However, there is a absence of studies that relate the human factors to individual 
characteristics, the emergency equipment, the EER procedures, and a system 
concurrently, which could affect the success or failure of EER operations.    
This paper proposes a tool for addressing human factors issues based on the barriers 
related to the evacuation operations. The main purpose of this tool is to identify and 
assess the contributions of human factors in evacuation operations that lead to an unsafe 
evacuation. Evacuation outcomes in the BP Deepwater Horizon accident are studied using 
this proposed tool. This will provide insight into human responses during emergencies 
that may help to improve emergency evacuation systems. The discussion emphasizes the 
contribution of human factors associated with environmental, organizational, and 
individual characteristics.  
5.2 Development of a Tool for Assessing Human Factors in the Evacuation 
Operations of BP Deepwater Horizon Accident 
5.2.1 Defining Evacuation Operations  
Evacuation can be defined as a process of leaving an installation and its vicinity, in an 
emergency, in a systematic manner and without directly entering the sea (Cullen, 1990; 
HSE, 1997; OGP, 2010). Successful evacuation will result in persons being transferred to 
a place of safe refuge, meaning a safe onshore location, or a safe offshore location or 
marine vessel with suitable facilities.  
For this study, the evacuation operations sequence follows basic EER stages as 
provided by OGP (2010). The sequence begins with an initiating event resulting in an 
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evacuation, which is when the offshore installation manager (OIM) assessed the severity 
of the unsafe conditions and decided to abandon the installation. It follows the sequence 
of an evacuation alarm, translation through emergency routes to a muster point and then 
to an egress point. Finally, the sequence considers leaving the installation as a final stage 
to stop the sequence.  
5.2.2 Framework for Assessing Human Factors in the Evacuation Operations  
This paper introduces three (3) components as indicated by a gray box in Figure 5.1. 
Those components are the development of evacuation protective layers, identification of 
human factors in the evacuation protective layers, and comparison of the evacuation 
operations with an evacuation preparedness plan. The information obtained in the human 
factors assessment will be meaningful to enhance evacuation preparedness planning and 
improve the effectiveness evacuation operations. Each component is further described in 
Sections 5.2.3, 5.2.4, and 5.2.5.  
  
Figure 5.1: A framework for assessing the contributions of human factors. 
5.2.3 Development of Evacuation Protective Layers  
The evacuation preparedness generally consists of the installation’s organization, 
personnel, evacuation procedures, and emergency equipment. Figure 5.2 shows the 
evacuation preparedness as a series of protective layers. Applying the protective layers, or 
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barriers, in the evacuation preparedness could possibly increase the likelihood of 
successful evacuation operations. The protective layers are dependent on each other to 
reduce the risks associated with emergency scenarios.  
According to industry-based guidelines, operators of an offshore installation play a 
critical role in the evacuation preparedness (CAPP, 2005; CAPP, 2010; HSE, 1997; 
IADC, 2010). The installation’s organization represents the outermost layer of the 
evacuation preparedness. At this level, the organization will decide on the quality of 
evacuation preparedness applied to the installation. The organization’s choice of the level 
of quality for evacuation preparedness can directly affect the risk to offshore personnel. 
Placing evacuation procedures and emergency equipment before the protective layers of 
personnel is meant to shield personnel from emerging hazards. Personnel must follow the 
evacuation procedures while using the emergency equipment to assist them to move 
towards a designated safe area and subsequently to abandon the installation.  
Hypothetically, unorganized and inadequate evacuation preparedness could result in 
four non-ideal outcomes:  
i) Minor Accident: An event with faulty emergency equipment that may cause minor 
or major injuries.  
ii) Accident: An event with faulty emergency equipment and inadequate evacuation 
procedures that may cause major injuries and temporary or permanent disability.  
iii) Major Accident: An event with faulty emergency equipment, inadequate evacuation 
procedures, and incompetent personnel that may cause one or more injuries, 
fatalities, and damage to property.  
iv) Catastrophic accident or disaster: An event with faulty emergency equipment, 
inadequate evacuation procedures, incompetent personnel, and poor organization 
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that may cause multiple fatalities and extensive damage to property, production, and 
the environment.  
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Figure 5.2: Schematic diagram of the evacuation protective layers. 
5.2.4 Identification of Human Factors in Evacuation Operations 
Human factors in the evacuation preparedness can increase the risk to all personnel and 
enlarge the margin of unsuccessful or unsafe evacuation operations. Human factors are 
generally defined as individual, organisational, and environmental elements that influence 
personnel’s behaviours and affect personnel’s safety (HSE, 2009).  
The barriers related to the mitigation of unsafe conditions or the susceptibility to 
human factors can be described by Reason’s Swiss cheese model. Breaches in these 
barriers can be due to unsafe acts or undetected defects. The presence of holes in one 
barrier does not necessarily cause a significant negative outcome. A fatal outcome can 
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happen when holes in many layers momentarily line up to allow a trajectory of incident 
opportunity to bring hazards directly to unprotected victims (Reason, 2000). Based on 
Figure 5.3, the catastrophic accident would only happen if the emergency equipment, the 
evacuation procedures, personnel, and the organization concurrently failed to maintain 
impenetrable barriers.   
Consideration of human factors in the evacuation preparedness of offshore 
installations is a key to successful responses or performances during the evacuation 
operations. The organization must first recognize human factors in the organizational 
structure of evacuation preparedness, which can be safety culture, documentation, an 
evacuation procedures design, emergency equipment design, emergency drills and 
exercises, and communications. For example, procedures must be simple and concise so 
that personnel are easy to understand and remember when in emergencies. The 
organization must also address human factors and remove latent conditions in the new or 
existing emergency equipment to reduce the probability of failure. As an example, proper 
scheduled maintenance, inspection, and testing of emergency equipment can reduce 
likelihood of technical problems during emergency. The organization must consider 
personnel’s human factors, such as skills, communications, stress, fatigue, the level of 
knowledge, the mental capabilities, and the physical conditions, in order to prevent 
personnel from making errors or performing unsafe acts. Conducting emergency drills 
containing unexpected events and credible evacuation operations can provide the 
necessary experiences needed to understand the overall risk of the EER process. Table 5.1 
lists a few human factors, which are normally investigated in the offshore major 
accidents, based on the evacuation protective layers.         
Human factors can be addressed proactively and reactively. A proactive manner is 
better than a reactive manner (AIChE, 2007). The reactive manner refers to the 
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organization using investigation reports of offshore installation accidents to identify and 
assess human factors.   
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Figure 5.3: An event tree for failures of the protective layers in the evacuation operations. 
Table 5.1: Human factors identified in the evacuation operations. 
Emergency 
equipment 
Evacuation  
Procedures 
Personnel Organization 
• Inspection 
• Maintenance  
• Capacity  
• Availability  
• Command and 
control 
• Documentation  
• Rules and 
Regulations  
• Supervision  
• Training  
• Knowledge  
• Experience  
• Training  
• Skills  
• Physical 
conditions 
• Psychology  
• Communication 
• Compliance with 
offshore regulations 
• Emergency 
management plan  
• Leadership  
• Procedures  system 
• Roles and 
responsibilities 
• Safety culture 
• Safety management 
system 
• Emergency drills and 
exercises  
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5.2.5 Comparing Evacuation Operations of BP Deepwater Horizon Accident with 
Evacuation Preparedness Plan   
The basic structure of an evacuation preparedness plan consists of the evacuation 
protective layers, evacuation sequences, and environmental conditions, as shown in 
Figure 5.4. The environmental factors, such as darkness, smoke, heat, noise, fog, and 
coldness, and hazard conditions, such as fires and explosions, must be considered in all 
the evacuation protective layers and throughout the evacuation sequence.   
Figure 5.4 can be used to assess the evacuation operations and to identify a series of 
human factors contributing to the unsafe evacuation operations. Each stage of evacuation 
operations must be assessed beginning from the emergency equipment to the evacuation 
procedures, personnel, and the organization. The assessment must include event types 
demanding evacuation operations, such as a loss of containment, fires and explosions, 
severe weather, and hydrogen sulphide (H2S) releases.  
Starting with the initiating incident, the alarm system would be used as a primary 
source of information regarding an emergency situation. Detectors on the installation, in 
particular for smoke, gas, and fire, are normally attached to an alarm system to indicate 
the presence of one or more hazards. When personnel receive notification of an 
emergency situation, they must immediately move to a designated safe area using an 
emergency route. In the case that a primary emergency route has been blocked or 
damaged by explosions, the personnel should know a secondary emergency route to a 
muster station and lifeboat embarkation point. At the muster station, personnel must 
register their names as part of a head count system, prior to movement to the lifeboat 
station. The coxswain must be knowledgeable and well-trained in manoeuvring the 
lifeboats to the closest possible safe place.  
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For a better understanding, a case study of evacuation operations on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon illustrates the method for assessing human factors is discussed in 
Section 5.3.   
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Acknowledging the 
incident 
Personnel moving from 
the area of hazardous 
condition 
Personnel assembling 
in a muster station 
Personnel moving to 
boarding area 
Personnel leaving the 
installation 
 
Incident 
demanding 
evacuation 
ALARMS ACCESS MUSTER EGRESS EVACUATE 
SAFE 
EVACUATION 
 Emergency  
equipment 
- Smoke/gas/fire 
detectors 
- Audible and visible 
Alarms 
- General Alarms 
- Public Announcement 
Emergency 
equipment 
- 2 emergency routes 
with signage 
- Adequate lighting/ 
illuminating routes 
- Sprinkler   
Emergency  
equipment 
- 2 muster stations 
with lighting 
- Heat/fire/blast 
protection  
- Personal protective 
equipment (PPE) 
Emergency  
equipment 
- Egress route 
- Adequate lighting 
- Helicopter 
- Lifeboat  
Emergency  
equipment 
- Lifeboat/ life raft/ 
helicopter 
- Adequate lighting 
 
 
 Procedures  
- Acknowledge the 
incident 
- Inform and 
communicate the 
situation 
Procedures 
- Move to the exit  
route 
- Move along the route 
- Direct to muster 
station 
Procedures 
- Register name 
- Headcount  
- Communicate the 
next action 
- Wear PPE if required  
Procedures 
- Move to lifeboat 
- Occupy the lifeboat 
- Prepare to launch  
Procedures  
- Launch the lifeboat 
- Maneuver the lifeboat  
- Leave the installation  
 
 Personnel 
- Follow instructions 
and procedures 
- Safe behaviours 
- Skills 
- Physical conditions   
Personnel 
- Follow instructions 
and procedures 
- Safe behaviours 
- Skills 
- Physical conditions   
Personnel 
- Follow instructions 
and procedures  
- Safe behaviours 
- Skills 
- Physical conditions  
Personnel 
- Follow instructions 
and procedures 
- Safe behaviours 
- Skills 
- Physical conditions 
Personnel 
- Follow instructions and 
procedures 
- Safe behaviours 
- Skills 
- Physical conditions 
 
 Organization 
- Inspection and 
maintenance of 
emergency 
equipment.  
- Communicate the 
emergency status 
Organization 
- Inspection and 
maintenance of 
emergency 
equipment.  
- Housekeeping to 
remove obstructions. 
- Communicate the 
accessibility and 
conditions of 
emergency routes 
Organization 
- Inspection and 
maintenance of 
emergency 
equipment.  
- Person in charge for 
headcount take the 
responsibility  
- Crowd control by 
the person in charge 
for headcount 
Organization 
- Inspection and 
maintenance of 
emergency 
equipment.  
- Control the situation 
- Give command/ 
instruction to leave   
- Coxswains take the 
responsibility  
Organization  
- Inspection and 
maintenance of 
emergency equipment.  
- Communicate about 
lifeboat launching 
- Coxswains are well-
trained to launch and 
maneuver the lifeboat 
- Communicate for the 
rescue process  
 
Figure 5.4: Schematic diagram of evacuation preparedness plan with basic requirements.
SURROUNDED BY ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
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5.3 Case Study: The BP Deepwater Horizon Accident 
The BP Deepwater Horizon (Macondo well blowout) investigation report presents meaningful 
input information for assessing pertinent human factors in the evacuation operations considered 
in this paper’s proposed tool. Details of the event are described in Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2, and 
5.3.3.  
5.3.1 The BP Deepwater Horizon Evacuation Operations 
A few studies have been conducted to focus on the evacuation operations of BP Deepwater 
Horizon. Skogdalen, Khorsandi & Vinnem (2012) discussed human performance and 
Rathnayaka, Khan & Amyotte (2013) studied the event failures involving human actions in the 
BP Deepwater Horizon evacuation operations. Both studies have no discussion on the 
contribution of human factors to the unsafe evacuation operations.   
This paper presents and discusses the evacuation operations starting from the activation of 
evacuation alarm to personnel leaving the installation.  
5.3.2 Major Incident Demanding Evacuation Operations 
Deepwater Horizon was a mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) owned by Transocean. On 
April 20, 2010, Haliburton and BP operators conducted two types of pressure test to determine 
the installation’s ability to drill to a depth of 9,000 ft (DHSG, 2011; USCG, 2011). At the time, 
the OIM and senior leaders were not present on the drill floor to supervise these tests. After the 
drilling crew finished the tests, they observed abnormal pressures on the drill pipe. Within a 
minute, hydrocarbons suddenly flowed out of the riser. As the flammable gas dispersed and 
found an ignition source, probably some electrical equipment, an initial explosion and 
subsequent fire occurred on the drill floor. Unfortunately, personnel were not prepared for the 
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well blowout and possible consequences. Two indications of well blowout are discussed in Table 
5.2.   
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Table 5.2: BP Deepwater Horizon major incident demanded the evacuation operations. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned   1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
Emergency Procedures for Uncontrolled Escape of 
Hydrocarbons 
Insufficient training for 
personnel handling the 
equipment in case of a 
blowout and its 
consequences 
Insufficient training for 
personnel exercising 
the procedures in a case 
of a blowout and its 
consequences 
Lack of training and 
experience in credible 
evacuation operations  
Poor organization of 
emergency drill and 
exercises   
Insufficient 
emergency drill and 
exercises  
Prior to the Macondo disaster, there were two blowout 
incidents:  
- Crew delayed in responding to indications that 
hydrocarbons were flowing into the well (no ignition 
happened).  
No communication for 
preparing equipment in 
case of a blowout and its 
consequences 
No instruction for 
applying procedures 
involving a blowout 
and its consequences 
No communication 
regarding indications of 
a blowout   
No effective 
communication of 
similar incidents  
Poor communication 
- Operators delayed in responding to an unanticipated, 
hazardous influx of hydrocarbons into the wellbore 
(no ignition happened). 
No preparation prior to a 
blowout and its 
consequences 
No written procedures 
or safe limits of a well 
blowout  
Unfamiliar with 
indications of a well 
blowout  
No documentation of 
emergency 
preparedness  
Poor organization of 
emergency 
preparedness 
 
 
5.3.3 Sounding of Alarms 
The MODU had gas detectors and ventilation systems in extremely hazardous areas which contain highly concentrated hydrocarbons. 
However, the BP Deepwater Horizon accident investigators found the gas detectors were set to an ‘inhibited’ mode which means the 
released gas could be reported to the control panel but no alarm would sound (USCG, 2011). Table 5.3 presents the description of 
alarms and the human factors involved in the alarm system.  
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Table 5.3: The event of alarm sounded for evacuation operations. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned 1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
Alarms were sounded after the explosion.  Late alarm activation  Delayed emergency 
notification  
Heard the alarm after 
the explosion  
Delayed emergency 
notification 
Delayed 
communication for 
emergency situation 
Multiple alarms activated without acknowledging 
situation. 
Multiple alarms 
activated  
Ineffective notification 
of emergency situation 
Personnel did not 
receive information 
regarding emergency 
situation 
Ineffective 
communication of 
emergency situation 
Ineffective 
communication due 
to multiple alarms 
General Alarm (GA) activated manually after the 
explosion.   
Late communication on 
emergency situation  
Delayed 
communication  
Heard the alarm after 
the explosion  
Delayed 
communication  
Delayed 
communication 
No Public Announcement (PA) regarding decision to 
muster prior to explosion. 
PA used after explosion Incorrect action  Received late 
information to muster 
Person in-charge did 
not follow the 
emergency procedures 
Mistake 
 
5.3.4 Moving Through Emergency Routes 
After the explosion, fires, and loss of electrical power, one of the crew ordered a muster to the designated emergency station. Later, 
another announcement required personnel to report to secondary muster stations. Details of personnel moving through emergency 
routes are described in Table 5.4.   
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Table 5.4: The event of personnel moved along the emergency routes. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned 1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
Some workers did not see or hear any alarms after the 
explosion.  
Late activation alarms 
not heard 
Delayed emergency 
procedures  
Physical ability 
impaired by explosion 
effects  
Explosion noise over 
the late alarm sound  
Explosion effects  
caused physical 
limitations 
Chaos in the area due to darkness. Lighting failure  Personnel performed 
evacuation in darkness 
Darkness caused stress  No person in-charge to 
control the situation 
Darkness affects 
personnel’s action 
and decision  
The workers re-route to the secondary muster station 
due to impaired route and flames. 
Inaccessible route  Personnel removed 
debris before can move 
Personnel decided to 
re-route and acted 
promptly  
Second emergency 
route was provided 
Decision to re-route  
The automatic sprinklers were discharging thus causing 
a slowdown in travel time. 
Sprinklers activated  Sprinkler slowed travel 
time 
Personnel attention 
distracted by sprinkles  
Not anticipate the 
route affected by 
activated sprinkler 
Sprinkler distracted 
personnel and 
slowed travel time 
Many of the survivors had difficulty finding their way 
out of the areas due to darkness. 
Lighting failure  Darkness affected 
personnel  
Darkness caused poor 
visibility  
Not anticipate the 
route affected by 
darkness 
Darkness caused 
physical limitations 
The deck was slippery because of the drilling mud and 
other fluids. 
Slippery route 
 
Personnel traveled in 
unsafe condition  
Personnel had to pay 
attention while moving 
 
Not anticipate the 
route affected by 
unsafe conditions 
Unsafe condition 
required attention 
The lighting for the escape routes was provided by the 
transitional power system. The normal power system 
failed and was not restored. 
Explosion effects caused 
lighting failure  
No emergency 
procedures assessment 
for power failure  
Darkness caused poor 
visibility 
Not anticipate the 
failure of power 
system 
Darkness caused 
physical limitation 
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5.3.5 Assembling at the Secondary Muster Station 
The explosions, and the fire that followed, produced intense heat and overpressure. The MODU did not have barriers to provide 
effective blast protection for personnel. Consequently, the muster of personnel at the secondary muster station was chaotic. Table 5.5 
lists the events of personnel muster at the designated station and the human factors identified during muster.  
 
Table 5.5: The event of personnel assembled at the designated muster station. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned 1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
The crew failed to register their name at the stations. Personnel were at 
secondary muster station 
No name registration  Personnel violated 
emergency procedures 
Poor command and 
control  
Inadequate 
supervision 
No accurate headcount.  Personnel were at 
secondary muster station 
No headcount Stress  Poor command and 
control  
Inadequate 
supervision 
The efforts to headcount failed because the workers 
jumped off the lifeboat.  
Personnel were at 
secondary muster station 
Personnel violated 
emergency procedure  
Poor judgement and 
perception reasoning   
Inadequate 
supervision  
Inadequate 
supervision   
Intense heat from the fire thus the crew concerned they 
would not survive. 
Inadequate heat 
protection  
Poor emergency 
procedures design  
Intense heat caused 
poor perception 
reasoning   
Poor organizing 
emergency 
preparedness plan 
Poor organizing 
emergency 
preparedness  
The assistant driller attempted to take a headcount. 
Headcount failed due to confusion.   
Personnel were at 
secondary muster station 
Headcount was 
irrelevant in the state of 
confusion  
Quantitative judgement 
became difficult 
Inadequate leadership   Inadequate 
leadership  
The master was not helping to minimize the chaos and 
confusion surrounding the muster and evacuation.  
Personnel were at 
secondary muster station 
No communication of 
emergency situation  
Stress could cause 
personnel had poor 
perception reasoning 
No communication Poor communication 
  
The first complete muster of evacuated crew was only 
completed after more than an hour later in Damon 
Bankston. 
Different place for 
muster and headcount  
Violation in rules  Personnel violated one 
of rules  
Inadequate 
supervision  
Inadequate 
supervision 
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5.3.6 Moving to the Point of Embarkation  
The route to the lifeboat embarkation point did not have adequate lighting to facilitate personnel entering the lifeboats as the accident 
happened at night. Descriptions of personnel moving to the lifeboat embarkation point are presented in Table 5.6.  
Table 5.6: The event of personnel moved to the lifeboat embarkation point. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned 1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
Some personnel made wrong time estimation and thus 
simply jumped to the water.  
Personnel did not board 
the lifeboat 
Insufficient emergency 
drill and exercises in 
estimating time  
Inexperienced 
personnel had a poor 
perception reasoning 
Poor organizing 
emergency drill and 
exercises  
Insufficient 
emergency drill and 
exercises  
Personnel had poor visibility due to inadequate lighting 
at the stations. 
Inadequate lighting for 
the station 
Poor emergency 
procedures design  
Inadequate lighting 
caused poor visibility  
Lack of  emergency 
equipment inspection 
Lack of inspection  
Personnel felt the intense heat from a drill floor or a 
moon pool fire. 
Inadequate heat 
protection equipment 
Poor emergency 
procedures design  
Heat affected physical  Lack of emergency 
equipment inspection 
Lack of inspection  
The boundaries established at the bow life raft 
embarkation station were inadequate to shield 
evacuating personnel from exposure to radiant heat.  
Inadequate heat 
protection equipment 
Poor emergency 
procedures design  
Heat affected physical  Lack of emergency 
equipment inspection 
Lack of inspection  
 
5.3.7 Leaving the Installation 
Prior to the lifeboats launching, personnel had to deal with environment factors, such as the lifeboats being covered with drilling mud 
as a result of the well blowout, insufficient lighting at the evacuation station, and the flames and heat. Launching and handling the 
lifeboats and life raft in these environment factors were difficult for the coxswain and personnel. Further description of the evacuation 
and the human factors are explained in Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.7: The event of personnel evacuated the installation. 
Descriptions of events 
Identification of Human Factors Based On Protective Layers Human Factors 
concerned  1. Equipment 2. Procedures 3.  Personnel 4. Organization 
11 survivors were unable to evacuate BP DH in their 
predetermined lifeboats.  
Capacity of one lifeboat 
was 73-occupants   
Early launching 
lifeboat  
Personnel did not alert 
people left behind 
Inadequate leadership  Inadequate 
leadership  
Personnel had to wedge themselves into the cramped 
lifeboat because some of the injured were lying down.  
Capacity of lifeboat 
reduced  
Poor of emergency 
procedures design 
involving injured 
personnel  
Stress due to cramped 
lifeboat  
Poor organization of 
emergency 
preparedness plan 
Poor organization of 
emergency 
preparedness plan 
The coxswain waited to receive the master’s order.  Personnel boarded the 
lifeboat  
No communication of 
launching order   
No communication 
between the coxswain 
and the master  
Poor organizing 
communication    
Poor communication  
Transocean operation manager instructed the coxswain 
to launch in the absence of the master. 
Lifeboat was ready to be 
launched    
Launching order from 
other than master   
Inappropriate decision-
making   
A split chain of 
command 
Bypass chain of 
command     
Transocean manager climbed on top of the lifeboat to 
activate the windshield wiper and clean the lifeboat’s 
windshield of drilling mud.  
Lifeboat was affected  Emergency procedures 
design did not consider 
the  consequences of 
blowout   
Situation awareness    Responsibilities   Situation awareness 
of unsafe conditions   
Inadequate lighting over the water into which the 
lifeboats were to be launched. 
Inadequate lighting  Lifeboat was launched 
in darkness 
Poor visibility  Failure to provide 
adequate lighting   
Poor visibility due to 
inadequate lightning  
Some personnel chose the life raft instead of Lifeboats 
3 and 4 due to unsure safe transit to the aft deck. 
No communication on 
status of transit  
No communication 
established to report the 
status of emergency 
equipment    
No communication 
received to make the 
decision    
Poor reporting 
structure  
Poor communication 
Personnel’s efforts to quickly launch the life raft with a 
line still attached to the MODU.   
Life raft was not ready to 
be launched  
No training of 
personnel using life raft 
and following 
emergency procedures 
Incompetent and 
inexperienced  
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan in 
using life raft 
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan 
 
Life raft occupants were tossed about and one 
personnel fell out of the life raft upon its impact with 
the water. 
Poor life raft safety 
design  
No training of 
personnel using life raft 
Incompetent and 
inexperienced  
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan in 
using life raft 
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan 
Personnel used life raft were subjected to extreme 
environmental conditions, that is, entry of smoke, 
radiant heat, and inadequate lighting.   
Poor life raft safety 
design  
No training of 
personnel using life raft 
Unsafe conditions 
affected physical   
Lack of life raft  
inspection  
Lack of inspection  
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The Central Control Room (CCR) was aware that crew 
members were jumping overboard but they focused on 
evacuation issues 
No equipment for Man 
Over Board (MOB)  
Violation of emergency 
procedures   
Difficulty to handle two 
situations at the same 
time  
No man overboard 
training provided to 
personnel 
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan 
Lifeboat 2 did not perform as a rescue boat due to the 
availability of offshore supply vessel, that is, Damon 
Bankston. 
Availability of external 
boat  
Violation of emergency 
procedures  
The coxswain did not 
perform the assigned 
roles and 
responsibilities    
Inadequate leadership  Inadequate 
leadership  
The master, the senior dynamic positioning operator 
(SDPO), the Chief Electronics Technician, and the 
motorman jumped directly into the water because the 
fixed metal ladders damaged 
Inadequate emergency 
equipment backup  
 
Emergency procedures 
design did not include 
back-up equipment   
Aware of damaged 
ladders  
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan to 
include back-up 
equipment   
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan 
Damaged 15 to 20 feet of the ladders were not repaired. Inadequate emergency 
equipment backup  
Emergency procedures 
design did not include 
and inspect back-up 
equipment   
Insufficient knowledge 
on importance of back-
up equipment   
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan to 
include and inspect 
back-up equipment   
Poor emergency 
preparedness plan 
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5.4 The Contribution of Human factors to the BP Deepwater Horizon Evacuation 
Operations 
Using the method for addressing human factors, the evacuation operations in the BP Deepwater 
Horizon were influenced by human and organizational factors, such as lack of emergency 
evacuation exercises for personnel, poor communications, inadequate leadership, lack of 
emergency equipment inspection prior to the well blowout, and poorly organized emergency 
preparedness plan and structure. Unsafe environmental conditions, such as darkness, intense 
heat, and a series of fires, were identified as factors leading to the catastrophic accident. 
Although the incident was considered to be a catastrophic accident, there were no deaths 
reported due to the unsuccessful evacuation operations (USCG, 2011).   
5.4.1 Lack of Emergency Drills and Exercises   
BP management categorized a well blowout under the Emergency Procedures for Uncontrolled 
Escape of Hydrocarbons operations (USCG, 2011). Although BP management identified the 
possibility of hydrocarbons release, the management failed to provide the comprehensive 
evacuation preparedness and training to all personnel working on the installation. Personnel were 
not equipped with good knowledge and experience of possible emergency situations and 
evacuation operations. Lack of emergency training exercises were identified as a critical factor 
exemplified by responses such as personnel jumping into the water. Mistakes and violations of 
some important steps in the evacuation operations happened because personnel failed to gain 
adequate knowledge and experience from the emergency training exercises. 
5.4.2 Poor Communication 
BP management failed to establish effective communications in the evacuation preparedness 
plan. The catastrophic accident may have been avoided if BP management and Deepwater 
43 
 
Horizon communicated and documented the indicators of a well blowout prior to the catastrophic 
accident.   
The severity of the situation on board the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) was not 
communicated to all personnel in a timely manner. The situation showed that communication, in 
particular the general alarm, was not sounded promptly by the person in charge. According to 
emergency response standard operating procedures, an authorized person must activate the 
general alarm manually after two gas detectors were triggered (USCG, 2011). There was no 
effective application of the emergency communication medium for notifying the personnel of the 
emergency situation. 
There was no clear communication regarding the command and control between the OIM, 
master, coxswains, and personnel. Failure to communicate the commands contributed to the 
uncontrolled event escalation, especially in handling and managing the anxiety of personnel.     
5.4.3 Physical Limitations Due To Distractions 
In the BP Deepwater Horizon accident, multiple noisy alarms were found to be distractions to 
personnel assessing the emergency situation. The explosion and fire elements, such as noise, 
heat, and flying debris, and activated sprinkler were also distractions that slowed personnel while 
moving through the emergency routes. Those distractions affected individual information 
processing and prevented individuals from performing the evacuation safely. As there was no 
backup power after the explosion, personnel had to perform the evacuation operations in 
darkness. Therefore, personnel’s ability to perform was affected by the darkness. Personnel were 
also highly stressed because they were unfamiliar with the evacuation operations and the 
consequences of a well blowout.  
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5.4.4 Poor Emergency Preparedness Plan 
Prior to the BP Deepwater Horizon accident, BP management was irresponsible in establishing 
an effective emergency preparedness plan to face credible emergencies. BP management failed 
to systematically inspect and test of emergency equipment. The heat protection was not reliable 
in reducing the consequences of fires and explosions. Reliability of the emergency lighting using 
the power system decreased as the power system was damaged by the explosion. The impairment 
of the lifeboats and the life rafts due to hazardous conditions and injured personnel were not 
anticipated. BP management were not being responsible in maintaining and repairing the 
damaged emergency ladders. If the organization had repaired the ladders, four people would not 
have had to jump directly into the water. 
Poor organization of evacuation preparedness resulted in inadequate leadership defining 
command, control, and responsibilities. The lines of authority and shift of responsibilities in the 
event of an emergency was unclear to some of personnel (Skogdalen, Khorsandi & Vinnem, 
2012). As a result, the personnel in-charge neglected assigned roles and responsibilities. Key 
personnel such as the OIM and master were not available in the control room to supervise 
personnel prior to the well blowout.  
5.5 Recommendation to Reduce Human Factors in the BP Evacuation Preparedness Plan 
Taking emergency drills and exercises as a main factor to successful evacuation operations, the 
organization, personnel, emergency procedures design, and equipment must control and 
minimize human and organizational factors at the same time. The organization should have a 
strong safety culture to encourage participation from all level to involve in the credible 
emergency drills and exercises using an evacuation simulation. A positive participation could 
identify weakness in roles and responsibilities, communication, and command and control. The 
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organization must motivate personnel to discuss safety-related concerns of the emergency drills 
and exercises to increase personnel’s skills in the emergency. Besides, the organization must 
supply personnel with necessary knowledge to evacuate quickly and effectively and increase 
personnel’s competency to use the emergency equipment effectively, such the lifeboats and life 
raft. In return, personnel must make every effort to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge 
for offshore survival. Furthermore, personnel should demonstrate their competence in the use of 
both emergency equipment and techniques. The organization and personnel must regularly check 
the emergency equipment and procedures associated with their capacities, arrangement, and 
performance standards during the emergency drills and exercises. Moreover, a stress 
management is crucial to personnel and the organization to avoid panic, unsafe behaviours, and 
wasting time when dealing with the emergencies.    
5.6 Conclusions 
This paper discusses a tool for addressing and assessing the human factors in the evacuation 
operations of BP Deepwater Horizon accident and the emergency preparedness plan. The human 
factors are defined according to the evacuation protective layers, that is, organization, personnel, 
evacuation procedures, and emergency equipment. Using the BP Deepwater Horizon evacuation 
operations as a case study, the assessment has revealed several human factors in the evacuation 
operations, such as poor communications, insufficient emergency drills and exercises, the unsafe 
conditions affected physical capability, and inadequate emergency preparedness.  
Findings from this paper are focused on the contribution of human factors as a qualitative 
technique only. A quantitative data analysis of the human factors can be generated as a reference 
and lesson learned to other offshore installations. For future work, the human factors associated 
with risks will be assessed using the Bayesian approach to estimate probability of the evacuation 
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operation’s success, and to enhance the application of the proposed methodology to offshore 
installations.    
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Abstract 
This paper introduces a methodology for identifying critical human and organizational factors in 
the escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) systems of offshore installations in a harsh 
environment. To elucidate the complex dependence of human and organizational factors on risky 
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incidents, this methodology uses a Bayesian network (BN) and a sensitivity analysis to assess the 
criticality of these factors. As a case study, the methodology is applied to the activation of an 
emergency alarm and considers the consequences introduced because of a harsh environment. 
The results of the case study show that the probability of success for personnel to become aware 
of an emergency alarm is most likely affected by noise due to strong wind. Using the proposed 
methodology, the probability calculations include the human and organizational factors that stem 
from the organizational level and extend to the evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, 
and personnel to provide a more practical result than the probabilities estimated by expert 
judgements.  
Keywords: Bayesian network; EER systems; Harsh environment; Human and organizational 
factors; Sensitivity analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Human and organizational factors can be defined as environmental, individual, organizational, 
cultural, and equipment, affecting human physical perception, behaviour and performance. Both 
human and organizational factors are primarily concerned with optimizing human performance 
in all tasks with the aim of achieving a safe operation (CCPS, 2007; UK Energy Institute, 2011). 
Human and organizational factors in the escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) system of offshore 
installations operating in a harsh environment must be well understood to avoid harm to 
personnel and damage to structure. Examples of human and organizational failures as described 
in the Piper Alpha platform disaster are inadequate training, lack of communication between 
personnel and management, and insufficient procedures and arrangement for safe EER 
operations (Mearns et al., 2001).  
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An initiating event, such as a well blowout, loss of containment, fire and explosion, and 
collision, require personnel to leave their work area, move to a safe place, and abandon the 
installation (OGP, 2010). Previous studies investigated and discussed qualitative methods for 
identifying hazards in the EER operation (Kennedy, 1993; Gould and Au, 1995; Boyle and 
Smith, 2000; Woodcock and Au, 2013). Fire and toxic or flammable gas releases are better 
known as chemical hazards (AIChE, 1999; Asseal and Kakosimos, 2010). Heat radiation from a 
fire or explosion and subsequent structural damage of emergency equipment are other potential 
hazards (USCG, 2011). Congestion in escape routes, unavailable alternative escape routes, 
inaudible alarms, and environmental conditions such as darkness, fog, cold temperature, and 
storms, jeopardise the safety outcomes of EER operations (Timco and Dickins, 2005; 
Matskevitch, 2007). 
Performing EER activities in the presence of harsh environmental conditions is challenging 
to personnel and management on offshore installations (Bercha et al., 2004). There is a need to 
study human and organizational factors in EER systems associated with harsh environmental 
conditions and hazards to improve safety of personnel. This paper presents a methodology for 
prioritizing human and organizational factors and discusses the relationships of harsh 
environmental conditions to these factors in the EER system. The methodology is a probabilistic 
analysis of EER systems considering human and organizational factors for offshore installations 
in a harsh environment. The safety of the EER system is assessed in terms of a) the probability of 
human responses influenced by human and organizational factors and environment conditions, 
and b) the contributions of critical human and organizational factors to safe operations. To reflect 
the complex dependence of the human and organizational factors and harsh environmental 
52 
 
conditions on the risks, the methodology uses a Bayesian network (BN) and a sensitivity 
analysis.  
6.2 Development of a Methodology for Prioritizing Human and Organizational Factors 
Figure 6.1 shows the methodology for identifying and assessing critical human and 
organizational factors in the EER system of offshore installations. 
6.2.1 Identify Input and Output Parameters 
EER systems consist of safety planning and management, evacuation procedures, emergency 
equipment, and human actions (HSE, 1997; HSE, 2002; CAPP, 2010). From the EER system, 
two types of parameters, input and output, can be assigned to begin the study. Input parameters 
are safety planning and management, evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, and 
personnel physical abilities. Harsh environments and weather conditions, such as cold 
temperature, poor visibility, sea ice and wind, can also be added as input parameters. An output 
parameter is a human response that depends on input parameters. The output parameter can also 
be called a basic event. 
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Figure 6.1: Procedures for analyzing critical human and organizational factors in the EER system. 
6.2.2 Assign Probabilities for Input Parameter 
Data on the failure probability for evacuation operations have been reported in the literature 
(DiMattia et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2006; Deacon et al., 2010; Deacon et al., 2013; Musharraf et 
al., 2013). Oil and gas regulatory and industry guidelines on emergency response and evacuation 
operations, specifically the prevention of fire and explosion, and emergency response (PFEER) 
(HSE, 1997) and EER (CAPP, 2010), medical assessment (CAPP, 2013a), and standard practice 
for training (CAPP, 2013b), can be useful references for estimating probabilities involving 
human and organizational factors for offshore installations in a harsh environment. Provisions in 
the guidelines can be considered as factors affecting human responses, as well as the 
Start 
Identify input and output parameters
Assign probabilities for input parameter
Use conditional probability table (CPT)
Develop cause-effect relationships
Calculate probabilities for output parameter
Sensitivity analysis (Are critical
factors reasonable?)
End 
Yes 
No 
Update and operate system
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performance of EER systems. The guidelines incorporate useful guidewords that can be 
translated to numerical values for provisions applied to input parameters using a scale of 
probability (Norrington et al., 2008). For the purpose of illustrating the methodology presented in 
this paper, we have posited probabilities corresponding to the guidewords in the PFEER and 
CAPP guidelines, as shown in Table 6.1.   
Table 6.1: Numerical conversion of guidewords. 
Guideword Probability  
Shall 0.80 to 1.00 
Should  0.65 to 0.79 
Can or May 0.50 to 0.64 
6.2.3 Develop Cause-Effect Relationships 
A Bayesian network (BN) can provide an assessment of uncertainties in the context of the 
assumed relationships of human and organizational factors (Ren et al., 2008; Trucco et al., 2008; 
Wang et al., 2011a; Wang et al., 2011b). The relationship can be based on three types of 
structural properties of the BN, which are serial, common cause, and common effect connections 
(Celeux et al., 2006; Langseth and Portinale, 2007; Fenton and Neil, 2013). The development of 
the relationship is known as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), which also refers to a qualitative 
element. For this study, the relationship may consist of safety planning and management, 
emergency equipment, evacuation procedures, and human responses. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show 
examples of common cause and effect relationships used for analysing evacuation operations 
considering human and organizational factors, and harsh environmental conditions.   
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Figure 6.2: Common cause and effect relationships. 
  
Figure 6.3: The presence of environmental conditions in the cause and effect relationships. 
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6.2.4 Provide Conditional Probability Table  
The output parameter depends on its relationships to input parameters and their probabilities. 
Both the probability and cause-effect relationship can be placed in a conditional probability table 
(CPT). The CPT can show the interaction between input and output parameters in terms of a 
quantitative measure. In this paper, each parameter is discrete and has binary states, such as ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ and ‘good’ or ‘poor’. Table 6.2 lists an example of a CPT for an alarm system and an 
audible alarm used in EER operations (Chen, 2011). When the alarm system is available and 
reliable, the audible alarm may either work properly or ineffectively. The audible alarm can be 
activated manually by personnel. The availability of the alarm system refers to data obtained 
from probability of failure on demand (PFD).   
Table 6.2: A conditional probability table of the reliability of the audible alarm. 
Alarm system 
Availability 
0.99 
Unavailability 
0.01 
Reliability of audible alarm: 
Good 
Poor 
 
0.99 
0.01 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
The CPT involving the alarm system can be extended with the inclusion of environment 
conditions and human response. Table 6.3 shows an example of a CPT for personnel to be aware 
of an alarm. The CPT consists of an alarm system, a visual alarm, darkness, and human response 
(Chen, 2011; Yun and Marsden, 2010). These parameters in the CPT show an interaction based 
on noisy-OR gates. In a Bayesian network, the noisy-OR gate can describe the interaction 
between causes and their common effects (Oniśko et al, 2001). This is illustrated by parameters 
in Table 6.3. As the alarm system is available, the visual alarm can be visible in darkness. 
Human response, such as personnel aware of or detect alarm, may depend on effectiveness of 
the visual alarm in darkness.  
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Table 6.3: A conditional probability table of human response (aware of alarm). 
Alarm system 
Availability 
0.99 
Unavailability 
0.01 
Visual alarm  
Good 
0.99 
Poor 
0.01 
Good 
0.50 
Poor 
0.50 
Darkness 
Yes 
0.81 
No 
0.19 
Yes 
0.81 
No 
0.19 
Yes 
0.81 
No 
0.19 
Yes 
0.81 
No 
0.19 
Aware: 
Yes 
No 
 
0.90 
0.10 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
 
0.50 
0.50 
6.2.5 Calculate Probabilities of Output Parameter 
The calculation for the output parameter depends on the number of input parameters. As in Table 
6.3, for a case with 3 factors and 2 levels each, there are 8 combinations with a binary state 
outcome, which requires 16 calculations. More specifically, for a state ‘Yes’ of personnel aware 
of the emergency alarm, it must involve eight (8) calculations of Bayesian. The same applies for 
a state of, ‘No’, personnel not aware of the emergency alarm.  
The calculation begins with marginalizing the output parameter. This is followed by 
calculation using Bayes’ theorem, with new evidence included in the calculation. An example of 
calculation for a visual alarm that has only one input parameter is shown below. The new 
evidence may refer to monitoring the state of ‘Good’ visual alarm with regard to ‘Available’ 
alarm system.    
Step 1: To marginalize probability  
P(Visual=Good) = P(Visual=Good | Alarm system=Available) P(Alarm system=Available) + 
P(Visual=Good | Alarm system=Unavailable)P(Alarm system=Unavailable) 
    = 0.9803 
P(Visual=Poor) = P(Visual=Poor | Alarm system=Available) P(Alarm system=Available) + 
P(Visual=Poor| Alarm system=Unavailable) P(Alarm system=Unavailable) 
    = 0.0179 
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Step 2: To add new evidence  
 (                |             
 (            |                   (                
 (            
  
                                                                       
The calculations applied here to a small number of input parameters can also be applied to 
large numbers of input parameters. A complex network consisting of many input parameters 
requires many more calculations, which is not feasible to be done manually (Weber et al., 2012). 
The calculation for a complex network can be done using Hugin, a model-based decision support 
software (Hugin Expert, 2014). Calculation in the Hugin software generates all probabilities in 
the form of percentages. The probability value can be obtained by dividing the percentages by 
100 percent. Figure 6.4(a) shows an example of marginalizing BN calculation of the probability 
of personnel becoming aware of the emergency alarm. Figures 6.4(a) and (b) have new evidence 
and use a backward analysis with the application of Bayes’ theorem in the Hugin software. The 
bars of ‘aware’ and ‘dark’ are the observations to be studied or investigated. The Hugin software 
will set each observation in turn to have a probability value of 1.00. The observation is 
considered as a piece of knowledge or new evidence to update the belief of reasoning associated 
with large and complex systems.   
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(a)  
 
 (b)  
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 (c) 
Figure 6.4: An example of updating probability for (a) a complex BN (b) with an assumed output 
parameter, and (c) with an assumed input parameter. 
6.2.6 Verify the Human and Organizational Factors Using a Sensitivity Analysis 
To verify the qualitative element and cause-effect relationships, a sensitivity analysis is a 
practical approach used in the methodology. Sensitivity analysis can identify potential flaws and 
prioritize input parameters in order to reduce the uncertainties in the most sensitive probabilities 
and assumptions. In the methodology, a sensitivity analysis can consist of a) measuring the level 
of uncertainty related to input parameters, b) determining the level of uncertainty that can affect 
the output parameter, c) determining the possible stability of the results that depend on the input 
parameter, and d) estimating confidence limits of the results. A tornado chart is a useful way to 
present the critical input parameters that can also affect the output parameter. By recognizing the 
critical factors within the EER system, measures can be taken to improve the probabilities of safe 
human responses and evacuation operations.  
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6.3 Case Study 
To study critical factors for safe evacuation operations on offshore installations in harsh 
environments, the paper discusses the results obtained in the proposed methodology. The case 
study illustrates the methodology as applied to human responses in an emergency scenario, such 
as personnel aware of the emergency alarm. 
6.3.1 Parameters and Probabilities 
Input parameters include safety planning and management, evacuation procedures, emergency 
equipment and personnel physical abilities. Details of input parameters are shown in Table 6.4. 
The output parameter reflects personnel awareness of the emergency alarm activated due to an 
emergency situation.  
For most input parameters in Table 6.4, the probability is based on guidewords because the 
parameter cannot be measured directly. These guidewords can be translated into probability 
values based on numerical conversion as in Table 6.1. An alternative is to rely upon expert 
judgement. The probabilities of good alarm systems, including detectors and alarms, are equal to 
0.99 each, information which is available in the literature (Chen, 2011). The probabilities of 
environmental conditions are estimated based on a research study for a potential Arctic 
development (Yun and Marsden, 2010). Table 6.5 shows the probability of a harsh environment 
in January in the northern hemisphere.  
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Table 6.4: Input parameters for personnel to become aware of emergency alarm. 
 
Table 6.5: The probability of harsh environment in January (Yun and Marsden, 2010). 
Harsh environmental conditions Probability 
Low temperature (<-40
o
F) 0.13 
High wind (>35 knots) 0.02 
Dark ( 17 – 22 hours) 0.81 
6.3.2 Common Cause-Effect Relationships 
Figure 6.5 shows the relationship that includes all input parameters beginning from alarm 
systems to evacuation procedures, equipment, physical conditions and human response. A long 
night period, strong wind and cold temperature as in Table 6.5 are attached to the node ‘Detect 
alarm’. If there is a high level of noise from the wind and surrounding facilities, the sound of an 
audible alarm may not be noticeable and distinguishable. Noise from the wind may also affect 
personnel in detecting the sound of the activated emergency alarm. A visual alarm is also 
Parameter Provisions  Guideword References 
Safety 
planning and 
management 
Alarm system Shall be effective PFEER (Regulation 11) 
Evacuation 
procedures 
Operational readiness  Shall be effective  PFEER (Regulation 11) 
Scheduled inspection Shall ensure 
Should ensure 
CAPP (EER; 6.7) 
PFEER (Regulation 8 and 11) 
Scheduled maintenance  Shall ensure 
Should ensure 
CAPP (EER; 6.7) 
PFEER (Regulation 8 and 11) 
Emergency 
equipment 
Fire and gas detectors Shall provide  PFEER (Regulation 10) 
Audible alarm Shall provide 
Shall ensure  
PFEER (Regulation 10 and 11) 
CAPP (EER; 6.1.1) 
Visual alarm Shall provide 
Shall ensure 
PFEER (Regulation 10 and 11) 
CAPP (EER; 6.1.1) 
Individual  Hearing  Required   Offshore medical check up 
Vision  Required Offshore medical check up 
Stress or psychological demands     Potential extended CAPP (Medical; 2.3.3 and 2.4)  
Human 
response 
Detect alarm Shall ensure 
Shall give 
CAPP (EER; 6) 
PFEER (Regulation 11) 
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activated at the same time. The visual alarm can be the main source of notification to personnel 
in conditions when audible alarms are more difficult to detect. 
 
Figure 6.5: The relationship of input and output parameters in the Bayesian network representing Arctic 
January conditions. 
6.3.3 Updating Probability 
Bayesian networks in Figures 6.6(a) and (b) are the same network as in Figure 6.5, with the 
addition of the probability values. Figure 6.6(a) presents the Bayesian network of detecting an 
emergency alarm with the probability values. All input parameters in Table 6.4 are assumed to 
have a prior probability of 0.85 or 0.90, which are in the range assigned in Table 6.1. This is 
further assumed to represent a good EER system. Given the effects of wind, cold temperature, 
and the darkness of night, the probability value for personnel to be aware of the alarm (Detect 
alarm) is 0.50. The main reason for the low probability value is the dependency of input 
parameters on each other, which results in a low joint probability value.     
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Figure 6.6(b) shows the Bayesian network of Detect alarm that has been set as a new 
evidence for the backward analysis. Table 6.6 summarizes the updated probability values in 
Figures 6.6(a) and (b). Appendix 6-A contains diagrams and information of the BN when new 
evidence of environmental conditions is 100 percent ‘True’ and added in the Bayesian analysis. 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Figure 6.6: Bayesian network with (a) probability values in Arctic January conditions and (b) ‘Detect 
alarm’ is set as a new evidence. 
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Table 6.6: Summary of updating probability values for personnel to become aware of the emergency alarm. 
Environment 
conditions 
(100% True) 
Organization Procedures Equipment Individual Response 
Alarm 
system 
Scheduled 
maintenance 
Scheduled 
inspection 
Operational 
readiness 
Visual 
alarm 
Audible 
alarm 
Detectors Hearing Visibility  Stress 
Detect 
Alarm 
Low 
temperature 
0.90 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.50 
Darkness 0.90 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.50 
Strong wind 0.90 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.52 
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6.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Confidence Limit 
A tornado chart can provide information on the degree of uncertainty of an output parameter. 
The largest bar in the tornado chart represents an input parameter that contributes the most to the 
output parameter.  
Figure 6.7 demonstrates the results of a sensitivity analysis. From the result, we can see 
that alarm awareness is most sensitive to ‘High wind’, followed by ‘Darkness’ and ‘Low 
temperature’. Referring again to Table 6.5 and Figure 6.6(b), the probabilities of wind and cold 
temperature are low. The probabilities and results from the sensitivity analysis can confirm that 
severe effects of wind, darkness, and low temperature reduce chances of personnel being aware 
of the emergency alarm.  
 
Figure 6.7: Result of a sensitivity analysis for personnel being aware of alarm. 
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To estimate uncertainty of an output parameter, a confidence limit is developed (see Figure 
6.8). The estimation is based on the value of the confidence interval, such as 90, 95, or 99 
percents. In this paper, we consider a confidence limit of 95 percent. The input parameters of 
environment conditions have the highest probability value compared to others. A numerical 
value at the confidence interval will give upper and lower limits of input parameters as listed in 
Table 6.7. The upper and lower limits of input parameters in Table 6.7 are basically the same 
information from Figure 6.8. Based on the analysis, at a 95 percent confidence interval, low 
temperature, darkness, and high wind have more influence than other parameters.  
 
 
Figure 6.8: Confidence limits for ‘Detect alarm’. 
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Table 6.7: Upper and lower limits of input parameters. 
Detecting alarm Upper limit Lower limit 
Low temperature 0.967 0.031 
Dark 0.960 0.031 
High wind 0.939 0.030 
Stress 0.690 0.022 
Visibility 0.690 0.022 
Hearing 0.690 0.022 
Visual alarm 0.489 0.016 
Audible alarm 0.489 0.016 
Fire & gas detectors 0.564 0.018 
Schedule maintenance 0.564 0.018 
Schedule inspection 0.691 0.022 
Operational readiness 0.564 0.018 
Alarm system 0.690 0.022 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Comparison between the Proposed Methodology and Other Models 
The probabilities calculated using the interaction of the human and organizational factors in the 
organization, evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, and personnel levels (see Table 6.8) 
are relatively higher than the probabilities estimated by DiMattia et al. (2005) and Musharraf et 
al. (2013). Previous studies using Bayesian network (BN) and the Success Likelihood Index 
Methodology (SLIM) to calculate human error probabilities (HEP) did not consider interaction 
between human response and environment conditions and possible effects on probability of 
success or failure.    
The BN often generates an appropriate likelihood function using expert judgements in the 
estimation process (Siu and Kelly, 1998). There are several drawbacks to using expert 
judgements related to subjective data, such as a spread or divergence of expert opinions, the 
dependencies between the opinions of different experts, the reproducibility of the results of risk 
studies, and the need to calibrate expert probability assessments (Cooke, 1991). The failure 
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probabilities based on guidewords used in this paper are different from the probabilities 
calculated using judgements from experts as a source of data. For example, DiMattia et al. 
(2005) and Musharraf et al. (2013) considered experts’ opinions as data in calculating probability 
values of human reliability.    
Data related to human and organizational factors are scarce, which prompts the use of 
expert opinions. The proposed methodology can minimize dependency on experts to give precise 
probability numbers for interaction between nodes in calculating the probabilities for human 
responses. For new or existing offshore installations, the interaction nodes between input 
parameters and harsh environment conditions may give information to experts and operators in 
evaluating performance of EER operations. Introducing the interaction and quantifying 
guidewords to find the probability value of human responses in emergency conditions can 
provide a better definition of effective and safe EER systems to offshore operators. The 
interaction consisting of human responses and the guidewords translated to numerical values can 
also be a source of information in complying with regulations related to EER systems.    
Table 6.8: Comparison of probabilities between the current study and previous studies. 
Human response 
Studies to find a failure probability value 
This paper 
use BN 
Musharraf et al. (2013) 
use BN for HEP 
DiMattia et al. (2005) 
use SLIM for HEP 
Detect alarm 0.501 0.414 0.396 
 
6.4.2 Effects of Critical Human and Organizational Factors  
Based on the methodology applied in determining personnel awareness of an emergency alarm, 
the trajectory of critical human and organizational factors starts within the organization level, 
passes through the evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, and personnel levels, and 
eventually shapes the human responses (Reason, 1990). Organization resources and constraints 
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can shape an individual’s ability and behaviours. Failure of human responses is a product of poor 
EER systems involving the organizational, operational, cognitive and physical conditions.   
For instance, there are three types of faults involving alarm systems (Kennedy, 1993; 
Gould and Au, 1995). The sensitivity analysis identifies the scheduled maintenance as a critical 
factor. Faults in the alarm system can be minimized through periodic examination, testing, and 
remedial actions. The organizational failure to emphasize the implementation of scheduled 
inspection and maintenance (i.e. leading indicators) can result in a deterioration of reliability and 
consequently, failure of the system’s function to alert personnel in a timely manner. In brief, the 
alarm system, scheduled maintenance, and emergency notification are strongly dependent on 
each other. 
Human and organizational factors associated with faults and harsh environmental 
conditions are some of the main problems in EER operations. The operators of offshore 
installations can identify potential accidents in EER operations when they understand and 
acknowledge critical human and organizational factors. The Bayesian network approach that 
considers parameters in the organization, equipment and evacuation procedures can provide a 
better understanding of effects of environment conditions to human responses while performing 
EER activities on offshore installations. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This paper introduces a methodology to identify critical human and organizational factors in the 
evacuation operations and EER system of offshore installations in a harsh environment. Critical 
human and organizational factors in the evacuation operation affect performance of the 
organization, evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, and personnel. A Bayesian network 
and sensitivity analysis are two techniques applied for prioritizing human and organizational 
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factors and the associated risks. Based on the results, the human and organizational failures can 
be identified starting from the organization and management level and moving to the activities of 
EER that involve equipment and procedures. Personnel are vulnerable to the hazards while 
performing the EER operations. The offshore installation’s organization must acknowledge the 
critical human and organizational factors prior to an EER improvement program. The results of 
sensitivity analyses are a reasonable basis for use in the evacuation improvement program to 
produce better safety performance during emergency scenarios and EER operations. 
Both input and output parameters in estimating the probability value of human responses 
may not truly reflect implementation of regulations on offshore installations. To make the results 
of BN more credible using the described methodology, it is recommended to use data from an 
experiment study on human responses in emergency situations. The experimental study using a 
virtual environment can provide a credible data for analysing human responses in emergency 
conditions with the presence of harsh environmental conditions. Results based on experimental 
data using the approach in this paper will be more appealing and convincing to researchers and 
offshore operators to gain information on safety in EER systems.      
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Appendix 6-A 
 
Figure 6.A1: Bayesian network for ‘High wind’ and ‘Low temperature’ have a likelihood of 1.00. 
 
Figure 6.A2: Bayesian network for ‘High wind’, ‘Dark’ and ‘Low temperature’ have a likelihood of 1.00. 
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Table 6.A1: The conditional probability table of personnel detecting alarm when the hearing condition is good.  
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26
Yes 0.99 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
No 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Poor
0.26
Yes
0.13
No
0.87
Good Poor
0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26
Yes 
0.02
High Low
0.81 0.19
No
0.98
High
0.81
Good Poor
0.74 0.26
Low
0.19
Good
0.74
Good 
0.70
Hearing
High wind (noise)
Dark
Visibility
Yes No
0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Good Poor
Low temperature
Stress
Yes No Yes No
0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Yes No
0.13 0.87
Detect Alarm
 
Table 6.A2: The conditional probability table of personnel detecting alarm when the hearing condition is poor. 
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26
Yes 0.99 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
No 0.01 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Hearing
Poor
0.30
High wind (noise)
Yes No
0.02 0.98
Dark
High Low High Low
0.81 0.19 0.81 0.19
Poor Good Poor
0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74 0.26 0.74
Good Poor Good Poor Good
No Yes No
0.26
Low temperature
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Visibility
0.13 0.87
Stress
Detect Alarm
0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Yes No
0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13 0.87
Yes No Yes
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Abstract 
Execution of escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) on offshore installations in harsh 
environmental conditions poses potential risks. A risk assessment must be prepared to improve 
safety of personnel performing EER activities. This paper presents a methodology for assessing 
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risks in EER conducted in such challenging conditions. The methodology considers an event tree 
analysis, a Bayesian network, and a risk assessment to integrate both qualitative and quantitative 
elements. A risk assessment of personnel responding to the emergency alarm is studied using the 
proposed methodology and considering the probability of coldness, strong wind, and darkness. 
The possible consequences of personnel not responding to the alarm during a hydrocarbon 
release include severe burns and death. To reduce uncertainty of the results, a sensitivity analysis 
is performed to verify the input parameters and safety barriers, such as human responses and 
emergency equipment. Application of the risk assessment considering dynamic environment 
conditions in the study of alarm recognition illustrates the importance of defining and setting the 
risk acceptance criteria to be used for safe EER on offshore installations.   
Keywords: EER, event tree, Bayesian analysis, dynamic risk assessment, harsh environment. 
7.1 Introduction 
For offshore installations operated in harsh environments, the operator must address remoteness 
and the physical environment in escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) systems. Performing EER 
in the presence of severe weather, cold temperature, poor visibility, sea ice and ice bergs can 
reduce personnel’s chances of survival (Timco and Dickins, 2005; Palmer and Croasdale, 2013). 
During emergencies, personnel depend on the reliability of equipment and safety barriers to 
protect them from undesirable outcomes.   
Safety planning and management, emergency equipment, and evacuation procedures are 
safety barriers required for emergency preparedness and EER systems of offshore installations 
(HSE, 1997; CAPP, 2010). By adhering to standard regulations, both emergency equipment and 
safety barriers are expected to work effectively during emergency situations. Personnel can 
familiarize themselves with evacuation procedures and emergency equipment in the basic 
82 
 
survival offshore training. Other than scheduled inspection and maintenance, the equipment and 
safety barriers should be tested through a series of emergency drills on offshore installations 
considering hazards that may be present during an emergency.  
As part of the regulatory approval process, the operator of offshore installations must 
prepare a risk assessment that includes EER systems (OGP, 2010a). The main focus of risk 
assessment is risk of fatality during EER (Vinnem, 1998). Estimating risks to personnel, in 
particular life-threatening and major injuries, can prompt the operator to prepare procedures that 
improve the chances of success in EER operations. 
This paper presents a methodology for assessing risks during EER on offshore installations 
in harsh environmental conditions. The risk assessment is dynamic in the sense that it accounts 
for changes in safety barriers and environment conditions over time. The methodology is 
illustrated using a case study. The case study uses probability data based on assumptions and 
expert judgement, because data for EER systems considering emergency equipment, evacuation 
procedures, human and organizational factors, and harsh environmental conditions are scarce, or 
unavailable.  
7.2 Concept of Risk Assessment for EER in Harsh Environment 
Three parameters in this risk assessment are environment conditions, human responses, and 
equipment as safety barriers, which relate to EER systems shown in Figure 7.1. Emergency 
equipment is activated depending on emergency scenarios and environment conditions. During 
emergency scenarios, the environment conditions may affect the effectiveness of emergency 
equipment, as well as the performance of personnel to complete the EER tasks. A risk 
assessment becomes dynamic with the integration of new information or observations of 
environment conditions, equipment, and human responses that change over time.  
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Figure 7.1: The effect of harsh environmental conditions on equipment and an individual. 
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7.3 Methodology 
Figure 7.2 presents a methodology for developing a risk assessment of EER systems.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: A methodology for developing a risk assessment of EER systems. 
7.3.1 Event Tree Analysis 
An event tree analysis is used to show the sequences of events involving emergency equipment, 
evacuation procedures, and human performance for every step. The event tree consists of 
probability of occurrence for outcomes of safety barriers performance in the emergency 
(Landucci et al., 2015). During emergency scenarios, the reliabilities of safety barriers can be 
degraded by environmental conditions and the presence of poor human performance and 
organizational factors (Paté-Cornell and Murphy, 1996). To integrate the sequence of events with 
harsh environment, human, and organizational factors, information in the event tree can be 
converted into a Bayesian network.  
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7.3.2 Bayesian Analysis 
There are many studies that convert an event tree analysis to Bayesian analysis (Meel and Seider, 
2006; Kalantarnia et al., 2009; Kalantarnia et al., 2010). The process of conversion should 
include developing a Bayesian network prior to Bayesian analysis. The Bayesian network is 
employed to study dependency or relationships among emergency equipment, evacuation 
procedures, and human performance based on a conditional probability table (CPT) (Eleye-
Datubo et al., 2006; Matellini et al., 2013). Human and organizational factors, and the effect of 
environmental conditions can be included in the Bayesian network. Hugin software is used here 
as a tool for developing the Bayesian network (Hugin Expert, 2014). 
7.3.3 Dynamic Risk Assessment with Environmental Conditions 
To perform a dynamic risk assessment, the task can be divided into two parts: a) calculating and 
updating probabilities of occurrence for all safety barriers and environment conditions, and b) 
analysing effects and consequences of failure to complete EER to personnel. The emergency 
equipment, evacuation procedures, human actions, and environment conditions can have two 
outcomes during an emergency scenario (Guanquan and Jinhui, 2012): fail or succeed. The 
number of failures or successes is assumed to be a discrete variable to give a probability of 
occurrence. The probability distribution for a discrete variable is called a discrete probability 
distribution. Binomial distribution is one example of a discrete probability distribution used in 
the paper.  
The Bayesian network can be extended to include harm to personnel and damage to 
emergency equipment. In terms of harm, the consequences can include both personnel’s injury 
and fatality (Vinnem, 2007). Types of injuries can be first, second, and third degree burns 
(Assael and Kakosimos, 2010).  
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Section 7.4 presents a case study using this proposed methodology.  
7.4 Case Study 
An initiating event that initiates the evacuation process of personnel can be a release of 
hydrocarbon fluid and gas that could potentially result in fires and explosions (DNV, 2015). The 
proposed methodology is used here in the early stage of EER, which includes the activation of 
emergency alarm (OGP, 2010b). The case study focuses on personnel in a working area when 
the emergency alarm is triggered. 
7.4.1 Prior Probability 
The case study begins with collecting probability data, from available sources for emergency 
equipment, human actions, and harsh environmental conditions, as described in Sections 7.4.2 to 
7.4.5. A prior probability is required in analyses involving an event tree, a Bayesian network, 
and a risk assessment.  
7.4.2 Emergency Equipment 
According to oil and gas regulatory and industry guidelines on emergency preparedness and 
EER, alarm systems consist of detectors and both audible and visual alarms (HSE, 1997; CAPP, 
2010; CAPP, 2013). Information on the reliability of detectors and alarms is available in 
literature reviews (Chen, 2011). The reliability of detectors and alarms can be used as a prior 
probability as shown in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1: A prior probabilities of alarm systems. 
Step Equipment  A prior probability 
Alarm Gas and fire detectors 0.99 
 Audible alarm 0.99 
 Visual alarm 0.99 
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7.4.3 Human Actions 
Failure probability of human performance during evacuation operations on offshore installations 
can be found in the literature (DiMattia et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2006; Deacon et al., 2010; 
Deacon et al., 2013; Musharraf et al., 2013). Previous research on estimating probabilities of 
human performance did not include environment conditions, which can influence the results. 
Based on the limitation in the previous studies, it is appropriate to consider the highest 
probability of success of human actions, information which is available in the literature review 
(Musharraf et al., 2013). Table 7.2 summarizes the list of probabilities used in this paper.      
Table 7.2: A prior probabilities of human actions. 
Step Action A prior probability 
Alarm recognition  Aware (hear and see the alarm)  0.92 
 Respond to alarm 0.83 
7.4.4 Environment Conditions 
The probability of environmental conditions is estimated based on a research study by Yun and 
Marsden- (2010). Table 7.3 shows the probability of a harsh environment in January and 
February. 
Table 7.3: The probability of harsh environment in January. 
Harsh environmental conditions 
Probability 
January February 
Low temperature (< -40
o
F) 0.13 0.20 
High wind (> 35 knots) 0.02 0.02 
Dark (17 – 22 hours) 0.81 0.60 
7.4.5 Injury and Death 
The probability of injury and death are calculated considering the distance of flame surface to 
human exposure is 30 m and personnel wear winter clothes that give a large coverage of skin 
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area (Assael and Kakosimos, 2010). Table 7.4 shows the probability of first and second degree 
burns and fatality.  
Table 7.4: Probability of injury and death in fires. 
Injury and death Probability 
First degree burn 0.14 
Second degree burn 0.10 
Death 0.06 
7.4.6 Event Tree 
As the primary physical barriers, gas, heat, and fire detectors can detect the hazards of 
hydrocarbon releases during the emergency scenario. Audible and visual alarms are the second 
safety barriers, with the purpose to notify personnel of the presence of hazards on the offshore 
installation. Upon hearing or seeing the alarm, personnel have to secure the work area, stop hot 
work, and move to muster stations. Figure 7.3 shows the sequence of alarm activation in a case 
of hydrocarbon releases on offshore installations.  
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Figure 7.3: The event tree of alarm activation. 
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7.4.7 Bayesian Network 
Figure 7.4 illustrates the Bayesian network for personnel responding to the activated emergency 
alarm. The detector is assigned as a parent node to both audible and visual alarms. Nodes of 
coldness, darkness, and high winds are connected to equipment (alarm) and human actions 
(aware and respond), where applicable. The node of respond is a child node and is the outcome 
of the relationships between equipment and environment conditions.   
 
Figure 7.4: A Bayesian network for personnel responding to the emergency alarm. 
7.4.8 Risk Assessment 
In this model, the initiating event is a release of hydrocarbon on an offshore installation. The 
worst scenario would be combustion of the flammable substances followed by a series of fires. It 
is appropriate to note that intensity and heat radiation, as a result from the combustion, is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The respond node is connected to a consequence node so that the 
probability of injury and death is identified. Figure 7.5 illustrates the risk assessment with 
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consequences using Bayesian network. In the diagram, 1 means ‘yes’ or ‘true’ and 0 represents 
‘no’ or ‘false’. In the consequence node, 0 and 1 refer to first and second degree burns, 
respectively. The possibility of fatality is represented by an indicator number 2 in the node.  
 
 
Figure 7.5: A Bayesian network for responding to alarm with probabilities in January. 
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Probabilities and Consequences 
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 illustrate the result of dynamic risk assessment considering the effect of harsh 
environments upon safety barriers and a personnel’s response. Based on the results, it shows that 
coldness, darkness and strong winds can affect the effectiveness of safety barriers and a 
personnel’s response. There are high possibilities that personnel may experience first or second 
degree burns if they do not respond after hearing or seeing the activated emergency alarm.  
 
92 
 
Table 7.5: Possible effects of environment conditions to personnel recognizing alarm in January. 
Environment 
conditions 
Probability of safety barriers 
Probability of 
human actions 
Probability of injury or 
death 
Detector 
Audible 
alarm 
Visual 
alarm 
Aware Respond 
First 
degree 
burn 
Second 
degree 
burn 
Death 
Cold 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.50 0.13 0.30 0.48 0.22 
Darkness 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.51 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.16 
Wind 0.90 0.90 0.75 0.66 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.16 
 
Table 7.6: Possible effects of environment conditions to personnel recognizing alarm in February. 
Environment 
conditions 
Probability of safety barriers 
Probability of 
human actions 
Probability of injury or 
death 
Detector 
Audible 
alarm 
Visual 
alarm 
Aware Respond 
First 
degree 
burn 
Second 
degree 
burn 
Death 
Cold 0.90 0.90 0.56 0.50 0.20 0.33 0.46 0.20 
Darkness 0.90 0.90 0.56 0.37 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.16 
Wind 0.90 0.90 0.60 0.50 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.16 
 
7.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted to verify nodes in the Bayesian network. The result of 
sensitivity analysis is shown in a tornado chart that provides information on the degree of 
uncertainty of safety barriers. The largest bar in the tornado chart represents a parent or 
intermediate node that contributes the most to the child node. In Figure 7.6, coldness and 
response are identified as the most influential nodes to the consequence node. The same result is 
observed for the sensitivity analysis of alarm recognition in February as presented in Figure 7.7. 
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Figure 7.6: Sensitivity analysis for personnel recognizing alarm in January. 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Sensitivity analysis for personnel recognizing alarm in February. 
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7.6 Discussions 
Dynamic risk assessment of EER systems that considers harsh environmental conditions can be a 
basis for decision making regarding safety on offshore installations. The purposes of applying 
dynamic risk assessment in the EER system are to identify potential accidents while performing 
EER, update the probability of occurrence of accidents using new data or observations, and 
provide safety measures based on the potential accidents and consequences.  
7.6.1 Identifying Potential Accidents 
The risk assessment can address the potential of accidents and their expected consequences. By 
referring to the probability, the operator of an offshore installation- can identify the most risky 
activity or sequence of events in EER during poor environment conditions. Information in the 
dynamic risk assessment can provide a better understanding of effects of environment conditions 
on safety barriers and human responses while performing EER activities on offshore 
installations.   
7.6.2 Updating Probability 
New observations or evidence related to the probability of safety barriers or environment 
conditions are important in a dynamic risk assessment. Observations can include a) new data 
associated with safety barriers or environment conditions and b) new cause and effect 
relationships in a Bayesian network. The new observations update information on the likelihood 
of accidents and their outcomes.    
7.6.3 Providing Safety Measures 
Based on the Bayesian network and the probability of occurrence, the operators can identify 
weaknesses in the sequence of events associated with human responses and safety barriers. 
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Information in the dynamic risk assessment of EER systems can be a basis for making decisions 
to provide more training and to improve effectiveness of safety barriers  
7.7 Conclusions  
The objective of this paper is to present a methodology of risk assessment for EER on offshore 
installations in harsh environmental conditions. The proposed methodology is applied to a 
sequence of events involving personnel responding to emergency alarms on an offshore 
installation. Cold temperature, strong winds, and darkness can affect the effectiveness of 
equipment and human responses during these emergency situations. The results of a sensitivity 
analysis show that coldness and human response are contributing factors to personnel responding 
to the emergency alarm.  
In this paper, the study does not specify types of fires and explosions, such as pool fire or 
jet fire. The types of fires can affect personnel’s interaction with the hazard and subsequent 
escape times. The reaction time of personnel moving to muster station is also associated with a 
specific layout of offshore installations. The risk assessment of EER at an accommodation area 
will not have same results as on a drill floor or other areas.     
For future work, it is appropriate to focus on reducing risks associated with EER systems 
by doing a risk management exercise after the risk assessment of personnel performing EER in a 
harsh environment.  
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Abstract 
This paper presents the use of a virtual environment in investigating the management of risks 
associated with human responses in emergency situations on offshore installations. The 
interaction of personnel using the safety measures in emergency situations can be affected by 
hazards, environment conditions, and factors such as malfunctioning equipment and inadequate 
emergency drills. Such situations have the potential to prevent personnel from arriving at a safe 
area, increase the level of risks, and consequently, cause injuries or fatalities to personnel. A 
safety hierarchy for risk management introduces inherent, engineering, and procedural safety 
measures for emergency situations on offshore installations. Experimental data collected from 
studies of human responses in a virtual environment are used to assess performances and risks in 
emergency situations. A virtual environment is a practical means to investigate risk management 
alternatives by validating the effectiveness of safety measures, providing support for 
improvement, and finally, proposing new design of safety measures.  
Keywords: Emergency situation, human responses, offshore installation, risk management, 
safety hierarchy 
8.1 Introduction 
The organization or operator of offshore installations should prioritize the emergency response 
plan and safety barriers for the escape operation in emergency situations. Safety barriers for the 
escape can include an alarm system, primary and alternative escape routes, muster stations, and 
personal protective equipment. The organization must ensure that personnel practice emergency 
drills and exercises to familiarize themselves with the equipment and procedures, and identify 
limitations, potential hazards and risks in performing escape from hazardous areas. The 
challenges and risks of performing escape depend on an individual’s skills and experience, 
101 
 
teamwork, procedures, roles and responsibilities, communication, as well as the emergency 
response plan, environment conditions, and reliability of emergency equipment. All of these 
factors influence the effectiveness of safety barriers, the success of escape operations, and the 
safety of individuals should an emergency scenario occur.  
The presence of hazards in the escape operation cannot totally be eliminated. Emergency 
scenarios in the presence of hazards can worsen when personnel fail to interact with emergency 
equipment and follow procedures consistently. The effects of fires and explosions and poor 
environmental conditions can cause failures of both personnel responses and the escape. 
There are many studies that have introduced or proposed effective tools and techniques as 
safety measures in emergency situations on offshore installation. DiMattia et al. (2005) and 
Deacon et al. (2010) proposed prevention and mitigation barriers in risk management focusing 
on personnel performing escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) activities. Andersen and Mostue 
(2012) presented integrated operations (IO) on risk management approaches using real-time data, 
collaborative techniques, and multiple expertise in making better decisions and implementations 
for the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Colombo and Golzio (2016) introduced a simulation-
based approach to train teams, including operators and managers, in making decisions and 
increasing their competencies as a team in critical situations. 
Poor performance or lack of response in emergency situations can result in injuries and 
fatalities to personnel. There is a need to reduce and manage risks associated with personnel 
performance in emergency situations on offshore installations. This paper presents the use of 
virtual environments in managing risks of personnel responses in emergency situations. This 
paper uses experimental data of human responses obtained from studies using virtual 
environments. 
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Section 2 describes the risk management framework. Section 3 explains the risk calculation 
and its formula. Sections 4 and 5 present two virtual environment experimental studies and data 
analyses. Section 6 concludes the objective of this paper.     
8.2 Developing a Framework of Risk Management for Escape in Emergency Situations 
A framework is designed to illustrate the development of risk in emergency situations, its effect 
on personnel responses, and the procedures for managing risks. Further illustration is shown in 
Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2.    
8.2.1 A Framework of Risk Management 
Figure 8.1 shows a framework of risk assessment and management for personnel responses in 
emergency situations. The framework consists of seven elements:  
i) emergency situations that require personnel to escape from hazardous areas,  
ii) hazards and factors that can affect personnel responses,  
iii) probabilities of success and failure of personnel responses,  
iv) consequences of failures to respond effectively,  
v) risk assessment by integrating probability and consequences,  
vi) level of risk accepted by organizations and operators of offshore installations, and  
vii) risk management.  
This paper focuses on the risk management element. The other elements are presented and 
discussed in other previous papers (Norazahar et al., 2014; Norazahar et al., 2016a; Norazahar et 
al., 2016b).   
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Figure 8.1: The framework of risk management for emergency situations. 
8.2.2 Safety Hierarchy 
Figure 8.2 illustrates a safety hierarchy that can be implemented through risk management of 
emergency situations. The safety hierarchy has three safety steps: a) inherent safety, b) 
engineering safety, and c) procedural safety.  The inherent safety measures can include: a) 
elimination and minimization of hazards, b) substitution of existing equipment, and c) 
simplification of procedures. Engineering safety requires adding safety equipment to facilities 
provided for emergency situations. Safety equipment can be either active or passive barriers, and 
its purpose is to provide reliable safeguards or equipment for reducing risks associated with 
personnel responses. Modification or changes to equipment must be followed by updating rules 
and procedures to allow personnel to have a better understanding of hazards, equipment, 
procedures, human factors and environmental conditions involved in emergency situations. 
 As case studies in this paper, examples of active safety measures are normal lighting and 
exit signage. An example of a procedural safety barrier is frequent exposure via drills to enhance 
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individuals’ competence. Normal lighting and individuals’ competence are explained in Section 
8.4.1.2. Details of exit signage as active barriers are described in Section 8.4.2.2.    
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Safety hierarchy for managing risks in emergency situations. 
8.3 Calculation of Risks 
Risk can be defined as a measurement of human responses (or hazards associated with human 
responses) in terms of the probabilities and consequences. Probability with regard to a specific 
action is an expression of likelihood and can be quantified to give a discrete value (Kumamoto 
and Henley, 1996). The consequences of failure are based on subjective evaluation and 
expressed as injury, fatality, and damage to an offshore structure and the environment. In this 
paper, risk is assessed with regard to the probability of human responses only. In case studies 
used here, we treat consequences of failure as neutral (i.e. risk is proportional to probability 
only). 
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The probability of human responses is calculated by considering the performance score in the 
emergency scenarios from two experimental studies, as further explained in Section 8.4. The 
performance score is analysed to determine the mean and standard deviation (Duarte et al., 2014; 
Smith, 2015a). Information on mean and standard deviation is used to calculate a probability of 
failure based on a normal distribution. The probability of failure can be a value on a scale 
between 0 and 1. This paper assumes a normal distribution to simplify the calculations.  
The next step is to estimate the risks associated with the human responses by comparing 
the probability of failure between the baseline and emergency situation equipped with safety 
barriers. The calculation of the change in risk is formulated as shown in Equation 8.1.  
ΔRisk = High probability – Low probability               …Equation 8.1    
8.4 Case studies: Experimental Scenarios Using Virtual Environment  
Data from two published experimental studies of different virtual environments have been 
selected to provide data for this risk management study. The first experimental study, entitled 
‘The effect of virtual environment training on participant competence and learning in offshore 
emergency egress scenarios’, is the source of data on human responses in an emergency scenario 
on an offshore installation (Smith, 2015a). The second experimental study, entitled ‘Behavioural 
compliance for dynamic versus static signs in an immersive virtual environment’, is the source of 
data on behavioural compliance with signage (Duarte et al., 2014). 
Both experimental studies were conducted using virtual environments (VE) with the 
purpose to observe human responses and behaviours during emergency conditions (Duarte et al., 
2014; Smith, 2015a; Musharraf et al., 2016). Simulating emergency conditions in the VE can 
provide a safe medium for participants to acquire artificial experience, which is otherwise 
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impractical and risky to obtain in a real situation. Details of emergency scenarios in the VE are 
explained in Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2.   
8.4.1 Offshore Emergency Egress Scenario on an Offshore Installation 
Emergency scenarios on an offshore installation were designed and simulated using the All-
hands Virtual Emergency Response Trainer (AVERT) software (Smith et al., 2015b; Musharraf 
et al., 2016). The layout in AVERT includes accommodations, a muster station located on the 
main deck (3 decks below the accommodations), and a lifeboat station, also located on the main 
decks. Three routes were provided as egress routes: a) the primary route characterized as an 
interior route with inside stairwells, and b) secondary and tertiary routes characterized as exterior 
routes with outside stairwells. 
The simulation scenarios begin with the activation of an emergency alarm (General 
Platform Alarm) that requires personnel onboard to move to a muster station using designated 
escape routes. In the case of an escalating event, an evacuation alarm (Prepare to Abandon 
Platform Alarm) is triggered to notify personnel to muster at the designated lifeboat station. 
Hazards such as blackouts, fire, and smoke were designed in AVERT to create credible 
emergency scenarios. The emergency scenario with the presence of hazards requires participants 
to find a safe route to a muster or lifeboat station by avoiding the hazard that blocks escape 
routes.  
8.4.1.1 Participants of study 
Thirty-six volunteers participated in the study. Participants were divided into two groups based 
on video game experience. The groups differed based on the amount of practice the participants 
in each group received. The 17 participants in Group 1 had repeated training. The 19 participants 
in Group 2 had a single exposure to training (Smith, 2015a; Smith et al., 2015b). The 17 
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participants in Group 1 reviewed training tutorials and repeated practice scenarios in preparation 
for the test scenarios. The 19 participants in Group 2 received the initial tutorial emergency 
training and no practice scenarios. Both groups completed the same four (4) testing scenarios of 
emergency response in AVERT.     
8.4.1.2 AVERT emergency response test scenarios 
Table 8.1 lists four (4) emergency scenarios in AVERT selected for this paper. From these 
different scenarios, two types of human responses can be analysed for the study of risk 
management: a) wayfinding in a normal lighting condition and in blackout conditions and b) 
competency of participants. 
Table 8.1: Description of emergency scenarios designed in the AVERT (Smith, 2015a). 
Scenario label Scenario description 
TA1 
The participants are required to respond to a general platform alarm (GPA) and find a 
way from their accommodation to their primary muster station.   
TA3 
The participants are required to respond to a prepare to abandon platform alarm 
(PAPA) and find a way from their accommodation to their lifeboat station in a 
blackout scenario due to equipment failure. 
TH1 
The participants are required to respond to a GPA because there is fire in the galley. 
The emergency scenario escalates and causes a PAPA activation. In response to the 
GPA, participants must go to a primary muster station from their accommodation. 
When the alarm changes to PAPA, the participants change their route and head to a 
lifeboat station. Both the primary route and muster station have been blocked by the 
effects of fires.      
TH2 
The participants are required to respond to a GPA because there is fire on the helideck. 
The emergency scenario escalates due to explosion and smoke and thus, it causes a 
PAPA activation. The task is that the participants must go to a primary muster station 
from their accommodation and change the route heading to a lifeboat station. The 
secondary route has been blocked by the effects of fires and explosions.  
 
i) Wayfinding in normal lighting condition and blackout scenario  
Wayfinding reflects the participants’ spatial knowledge of the platform, specifically their 
understanding of the layout and egress routes. The wayfinding is assessed by considering a) the 
route selection (primary, secondary, and tertiary routes), b) the arrival at the correct muster or 
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lifeboat station, and c) incorrect deviations along the route. The participants’ performance is 
compared to responses during two different emergency scenarios, which are a) in a normal 
lighting condition (TA1) and b) a blackout scenario (TA3). 
ii) Competency of participants 
In this paper, competence is defined as demonstration of knowledge related to alarms 
recognition, routes and mapping, and hazards avoidance, which participants gained in the 
training tutorials. The participants were evaluated based on their performance in recognizing 
types of alarm, re-routing and taking safe routes, avoiding hazards on route, and arriving at the 
correct muster or lifeboat station. Competency of participants was assessed in two emergency 
scenarios with escalating events that required them to re-route due to a) primary route and muster 
station were blocked by fire and smoke (TH1) and b) secondary route was blocked by fires, 
explosions, and smoke (TH2).  
Criteria used in assessing wayfinding and competency of participants are summarized in 
Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2: Criteria in assessing responses of participants during emergency scenarios. 
Criteria  Types of scenarios  
Wayfinding in different conditions Competency  
Scenarios  - TA1 and TA3 - TH1 and TH2 
Criteria for 
calculating risks 
- Take primary, secondary, or tertiary 
route,  
- No change of route from one to 
another route, and 
- Arrive at the correct location. 
- Take primary, secondary, or tertiary 
route,  
- Re-route when the route has been 
blocked or affected by the effects of fires 
and explosions,  
- Avoid hazards, and 
- Arrive at the correct location. 
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8.4.2 Behavioural Compliance for Dynamic versus Static Signs in a Building Evacuation  
Researchers (Duarte et al., 2014) used an immersive virtual environment known as ErgoVR to 
investigate dynamic versus static signs on human behaviour during emergency evacuation. 
ErgoVR simulated a building consisting of four (4) rooms: meeting room, laboratory, cafeteria, 
and warehouse. The walls of the rooms and hallway have safety signs and exit signs. The 
experiment required participants to go to every room and look for instructions for the given tasks 
in the scenario. When the participants entered a warehouse an animation of an explosion 
followed by a fire suddenly occurred. The fire alarm was triggered due to the explosion and fire 
in the VE. All corridors except the exit route were affected by the hazard and blocked by flames 
and smoke. The emergency scenario required participants to follow the exit signs in order to 
safely evacuate the building.        
8.4.2.1 Participants of study 
A total of 90 participants consisting of university students were involved in the experimental 
study. Thirty (30) participants were assigned to each of the following groups according to the 
different types of exit signs: a) with a minimal design, b) in a static, and c) in a dynamic 
configuration.   
8.4.2.2 Types of exit signage  
Available egress routes were marked by exit signs consisting of an arrow and a running figure in 
a doorway. The experiment varied the number of exit signs available and the type of exit signs 
(static and dynamic signs). Three different types of exit signs are described in Table 8.3.  
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Table 8.3: Description of exit signs used in the virtual environment (Duarte et al., 2014). 
Type of signage Description 
Minimal exit signs 
The scenario of evacuation with minimal design of exit signs is assigned as a 
baseline with a purpose to assess the impact of exit signs on behavioural 
compliance.  
Static exit signs 
The exit route in the VE is equipped with color printed exit signs.  
Dynamic exit signs 
The exit signs in the VE are designed to have five (5) flashing lights in an 
orange color and an alarm ‘beep’ sound activated or de-activated by sensors.  
 
The objective of the study was to investigate human behaviour in complying with exit signs. The 
participants were expected to move toward the exit door following the exit signs in order to 
evacuate the building safely. They were given scores for the performance of safe evacuation 
(Duarte et al., 2014). 
8.5 Data Analysis to Determine Risks Associated With Human Responses 
Sections 8.5.1, 8.5.2, and 8.5.3 present the results of data analysis for the following factors: 
wayfinding in normal lighting conditions compared to blackout scenario, competency of 
participants in emergency offshore evacuation, and behavioural compliance with exit signs, 
respectively.        
8.5.1 Impact of Lighting Condition and Blackout Scenario on Wayfinding 
Some participants (Smith, 2015a) used the primary and secondary routes from the 
accommodations to arrive at the muster station in the testing scenario with a normal lighting 
condition (TA1). In a blackout scenario (TA3), the participants are required to find a lifeboat 
station from their accommodation using available routes. The experimental data of TA3 shows 
that participants used all routes available, which are primary, secondary, and tertiary routes.  
The change in risk represents the difference between the probabilities of failure for the 
blackout and normal lighting scenarios (denoted as ΔRiskBlackout). As indicated in Figure 8.3, the 
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value of the change in risk is 0.46. The risk of error in wayfinding is high due to the difference 
between the use of the primary route in normal lighting conditions and the use of primary, 
secondary, and tertiary routes in the blackout scenario.  
 
Figure 8.3: Risks of wayfinding in blackout scenario. 
8.5.2 Competence 
Scenario TA1 can be used as a baseline for assessing the performance of participants in 
emergency situations. The probability of failure in TA1 is 0.44. The majority of participants in 
TA1 successfully performed the scenario by selecting and taking a primary egress route from 
their accommodation to a muster station. 
8.5.2.1 Emergency scenario requiring hazards avoidance and re-routing (TH1) 
In test scenario TH1 there was a fire and smoke blocking the muster station and primary egress 
route. Participants were required to re-route from the primary egress route to a secondary route 
due to the hazard blocking the end of the primary route and muster station. The requirement of 
participants to re-route was communicated using an evacuation alarm change and a public 
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address (PA) announcement. The performance of participants in Groups 1 and 2 is described 
below.    
i) Performance of participants in Group 1 
Based on experimental data, the probability of failure with regard to performance of participants 
in Group 1 in TH1 is 0.96. There were only four (4) participants who successfully re-routed from 
the primary to the secondary egress route after hearing the evacuation alarm (PAPA). Three (3) 
participants only changed their route from the primary to the secondary egress route after 
encountering the hazards.  
The difference in probabilities between TA1 and TH1 is denoted as ΔRiskGroup1 with a 
value of 0.52. The change in risk is shown in Figure 8.4. The experimental data from TA1 and 
TH1 show that participants preferred to use the primary route as their main means to the muster 
and lifeboat stations.    
ii) Performance of participants in Group 2 
The probability of failure of participants in Group 2 in TH1 is 0.94. Of all the participants in 
Group 2 (n=19), seven (7) participants managed to re-route to the secondary egress route after 
hearing the evacuation alarm (PAPA) and arrive at the lifeboat station safely.  
The comparison of the probabilities of failure between TH1 and TA1 yields in a 
ΔRiskGroup2 of 0.40, as shown in Figure 8.4. The contributing factor to the risk is likely due to a 
small number of participants who did not change the route from the primary to the secondary 
egress route even after they heard the evacuation alarm (PAPA) and failed to arrive at the 
lifeboat station. 
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Figure 8.4: Competence and risks in TH1. 
8.5.2.2 Emergency scenario requiring hazards avoidance and re-routing (TH2) 
The emergency situation in test scenario TH2 involves a fire on a helideck. Fire and smoke 
blocked the entrance of the secondary and tertiary egress routes. Participants were required to 
move from their accommodation to the primary muster station and re-route to the lifeboat station 
due to the escalating event. The requirement of participants to re-route is communicated using an 
evacuation alarm (PAPA) change and a public address (PA) announcement. The performance of 
participants in Groups 1 and 2 is described below. 
i) Performance of participants in Group 1 
The probability of failure of participants in Group 1 in test scenario TH2 is 0.64. There were 12 
participants who successfully used the primary route after taking into consideration the 
evacuation alarm (PAPA) and PA announcement explaining the unsafe condition of a secondary 
egress route (outside stairwell). Comparing the data of TA1 (as a baseline) to assess performance 
in TH2, it is found that ΔRiskGroup1 is 0.20 as presented in Figure 8.5. The contributing factor to 
the risk value is due to four (4) participants who failed to re-route after hearing the PAPA alarm 
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or after encountering the hazards. There was also one participant who became lost and therefore 
failed to reach at the lifeboat station.   
ii) Performance of participants in Group 2 
The probability of failure performance in Group 2 in TH2 is 0.81. Only nine (9) participants 
managed to successfully re-route and use the primary egress route leading to the lifeboat station. 
The difference in performance of participants between TA1 and TH2 is denoted as ΔRiskGroup2 
as shown in Figure 8.5. From the data, it is observed that some participants used the secondary 
egress route as a way to the lifeboat station no matter what the circumstances. These participants 
did not re-route even after they heard the PAPA alarm and did not re-route after they 
encountered the hazard. 
 
Figure 8.5: Competence and risks in TH2. 
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8.5.3 Behavioural Compliance with Exit Signs 
8.5.3.1 Minimal signs as a baseline 
Exit signs with a minimal design were used as a baseline in this case study. Experimental data 
collected from behavioural compliance of participants with minimal design of exit signs can be 
compared to behavioral compliance with static and dynamic exit signs. The probability of failure 
to follow minimal design of exit signs is 0.99. The high probability indicates the participants 
were not influenced by the minimal exit signs on the egress route.   
8.5.3.2 Static exit signs and dynamic exit signs 
In Figure 8.6, ΔRiskStatic represents the difference in probability between minimal exit signs and 
static exit signs. It has a value of 0.19. This change in risk shows that the influence of static exit 
signs is better than a group of participants using minimal exit signs during emergency (Duarte et 
al., 2014). 
In the experimental study, the probability of failure of participants to take egress routes 
following the direction shown by a dynamic exit signs is 0.71. Using the minimal design of exit 
signs as a baseline (with the probability of 0.99), the comparison of participants’ behavioural 
compliance with dynamic exit signs is denoted as ΔRiskDynamic. As shown in Figure 8.6, Δ
RiskDynamic has a value of 0.28. The dynamic exit signs had more impact on participants’ decision 
to take egress routes during emergency than the static exit signs. 
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Figure 8.6: Risks of not complying exit signs. 
8.6 Discussion 
Findings of the use of a virtual environment for assessing risk management options in emergency 
scenarios are discussed in Sections 8.6.1, 8.6.2, and 8.6.3.  
8.6.1 Validating Safety Measures 
A virtual environment is a practical tool for an individual to demonstrate their learning, 
understanding, and skills of escape. There are two types of safety measures validated in both 
experimental studies presented in this paper: a) engineering safety, which includes lighting and 
exit signs, and b) procedural safety, which includes competence in emergency scenarios. 
Participants in both the experimental studies were practiced using the safety measures, which are 
similar to the safety measures provided on offshore installations. Credible emergency scenarios 
with the presence of hazards in a virtual environment can allow an individual to interact and 
familiarize him/herself with the safety measures.    
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8.6.2 Providing Evidence to Improve Safety Measures 
Data of performance in emergency scenarios using virtual environments could provide support 
and evidence to improve engineering and procedural safety measures. Risks associated with 
performance in emergency scenarios using virtual environments can demonstrate the need for 
improvement of the existing safety measures. The improvements can be proposed using a safety 
hierarchy with the objective to reduce risks associated with performance. 
8.6.3 Designing and Implementing New Safety Measures 
The use of virtual environments in a risk management study is a starting point for decision 
making on the design and implementation of new or existing structures or safety measures. A 
virtual environment can be used to experiment and implement new safety measures for 
emergency situations. The decision to implement in real life can be based on the performance of 
individuals interacting with the safety measures in a virtual environment.  
8.7 Conclusions 
Virtual environment can be used to assess human responses and the risks associated with human 
responses during emergency situations. The experimental data of human behaviour during 
emergency scenarios in virtual environments show that participants’ performance is dependent 
on the types of equipment implemented in the environment and the egress route choices that 
have been trained. Risks are analysed to illustrate the differences between participants’ 
performance with and without the presence of safety measures. Safety measures are identified 
and discussed according to a safety hierarchy that consists of engineering safety and procedural 
safety. Participants’ performance and their interaction with safety measures can lead to design 
improvements for emergency equipment. The new design of safety measures should be tested in 
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a virtual environment prior to implementation in real life to avoid making poor decisions in 
safety management.  
This paper presents the risks and the associated safety measures based on data collected in 
virtual emergency scenarios from two published studies (Duarte et al., 2014; Smith, 2015). The 
data analysis does not consider the long-term effects of the VE on participants’ performance. The 
calculation of probability based on a normal distribution is not verified scientifically. 
For future work, verification such as confidence interval should be included in the risk 
management study to make the calculation of probability and risk more credible. Data analysis 
should also consider consequences of failure in performing escape. The risk can be minimized or 
managed considering both probability and consequences aspects.        
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
This research has achieved the objective of the study, which is to develop a framework of human 
and organizational factors risk assessment and management for the operation of escape and 
evacuation on offshore installations. The significance of the framework includes the ability to a) 
identify the presence of human and organizational factors that can affect personnel responses, b) 
estimate the probability of success of personnel responses considering human and organizational 
factors and environmental conditions, and c) manage risks associated with personnel responses 
considering engineering and procedural safety in the operation of escape and evacuation. The 
conclusion for each part of the framework is described in Sections 9.1 until 9.4.   
9.1 A Framework for Identifying Human and Organizational Factors Is Developed Based 
On Layers of Protection  
The framework for identifying human and organizational factors is developed considering layers 
of protection. Human and organizational factors are defined according to layers of protection that 
consist of organization, evacuation procedures, emergency equipment, and personnel 
capabilities. Human and organizational factors are identified when a layer of protection fails to 
stop or prevent hazards from evolving. The framework of human and organizational factors 
identification has been applied to assess the escape and evacuation operations of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon. Human and organizational factors, in particular poor communications, 
insufficient emergency drills and exercises, unsafe conditions that affect physical capabilities, 
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and inadequate emergency preparedness all affect personnel’s ability to perform escape and 
evacuation activities and increase risks to personnel. 
9.2 The Probability of Success of Personnel Responses Is Calculated Using Bayesian 
Analysis 
Bayesian analysis is used to show the relationships between human and organizational factors 
and equipment and procedures at every level of the protective layers of an escape and evacuation 
system. From these relationships, the probability of success of personnel responses is calculated 
considering the human and organizational factors and harsh environmental conditions. Bayesian 
analysis integrated with sensitivity analysis has identified critical human and organizational 
factors in the escape and evacuation operations of offshore installations in a harsh environment. 
Based on the results of sensitivity analysis, the alarm system must be well maintained and 
assessed for operational readiness to ensure the audible alarm is working effectively in the event 
of emergency. Personnel must be alert to both audible and visual alarms, particularly in the 
presence of high wind, darkness, and low temperature, should an emergency occur. Both 
Bayesian and sensitivity analyses illustrate the importance of the offshore installation’s 
organization acknowledging critical human and organizational factors prior to an escape and 
evacuation improvement program. 
9.3 Risks Associated With Personnel Responses Are Assessed Considering Changes to 
Barriers and Environment Conditions over Time 
The sequence of events involving personnel responses, the use of emergency equipment, and 
evacuation procedures is translated to cause-effect relationships using Bayesian analysis. The 
approach is designed to be a dynamic risk assessment that includes safety barriers of the escape 
and evacuation system and harsh environmental conditions changing over time. The results of 
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using the approach show that cold temperature, strong winds, and darkness can affect the 
effectiveness of equipment and personnel awareness of alarms during emergency situations. 
9.4 Risk Management and Safety Hierarchy Is Validated Using Data from the 
Experimental Study of Human Responses in Emergency Scenario 
The risks associated with personnel responses in emergency situations are analysed with and 
without the presence of safety barriers. There are two safety barriers applicable to the emergency 
escape and evacuation, which are engineering safety and procedural safety. Human responses in 
the presence of engineering safety and procedural safety are observed and assessed in emergency 
escape and evacuation using a virtual environment. The risk management study using the safety 
hierarchy shows that the design of emergency equipment and the structure of the surroundings 
must consider human responses in emergency situations. The design and implementation of 
safety measures should consider the capacity of humans to react and make decisions during 
emergencies. 
9.5 Research Limitations 
There are limitations in this research that may restrict the application of the framework. The 
limitations are discussed as follows:     
9.5.1 Uncertainty in Translating Guidewords in Oil and Gas Industry Standard Practice 
and Guidelines to Quantitative Probabilities Data 
The case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 used as probability data, numbers translated (subjectively) 
from guidewords. The translation is uncertain, and may give overestimated or underestimated 
probability values. The presence of uncertainty in the calculation can influence the probability 
value of personnel responses.    
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9.5.2 The Scarcity of Human Responses Data during Escape and Evacuation with Hazards 
and Harsh Environmental Conditions 
Data on human responses performing escape and evacuation is difficult to obtain. The 
application of the framework requires data on human responses while performing escape and 
evacuation activities considering harsh environmental conditions. The case study in Chapter 7 
uses two different types of probability data: a) human responses performing escape and 
evacuation and b) harsh environmental conditions. The probability data in two different 
conditions may give inaccurate results.   
9.5.3 The Focus of Research Work Is on Emergency Escape Part Only  
The case studies presented in the research papers consider failures of personnel to detect an 
alarm in emergency situations. The framework has not been tested and applied to overall escape, 
evacuation and rescue (EER) operations. There are no results or discussion on evacuation and 
rescue operations.     
9.6 Future Work 
There are recommendations for improving the study. The recommendations are as follows: 
9.6.1 Use Experimental Data to Find Probabilities of Human Responses 
To obtain credible probability data on human responses, it would be helpful to conduct an 
experimental study of personnel performing escape and evacuation activities using a virtual 
environment. The experimental data can reduce the uncertainty related to the probability of 
failures and effectiveness of escape and evacuation operations. The experimental study should 
consider the presence of hazards and harsh environmental conditions during emergency response 
situations. The data from the experimental study will be meaningful to offshore oil and gas 
industry operations in harsh environmental conditions. 
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9.6.2 Validate the Framework in an Experimental or a Case Study  
The framework of risk assessment and management for human and organizational factors and its 
application should be validated in an experimental study or case studies of offshore accidents. 
Validation is important to assessing the practicality of the framework and its application to the 
offshore oil and gas industry. The framework applied in the experimental or case study can 
provide evidence of the effectiveness of the framework in assessing and managing risks.    
9.6.3 Include Risk Communication in the Framework  
The framework of risk management of human and organizational factors for the escape and 
evacuation system should have a risk communication aspect to explain risk perception to 
designers, researchers, operators, and people working onboard. Personnel and operators of 
offshore installations may have a different understanding of the risks associated with escape and 
evacuation. Risk communication is one approach to ensure that the designers, operators, 
personnel, and researchers have the same perception of the risks associated with human 
responses in escape and evacuation activities.   
9.6.4 Examine the impact of unsuccessful escape and evacuation operations  
The study of personnel failure in the operation of escape and evacuation should be examined in 
terms of economic valuation to personnel and the organization. The consequences of failures in 
the escape and evacuation operations can be divided into two categories. The first category of 
consequences is associated with personnel and includes minor or major injuries, temporary or 
permanent disability caused by injuries, and fatality during the escape and evacuation operations. 
The valuation of injuries and disability of personnel should be done by the organization. The 
responsibility of the organization toward the personnel’s health and medical insurance and 
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treatment can fall into the second category of the consequences of the failures of escape and 
evacuation operations. 
